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# **The political dispute between the government of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri and the Sudanese Communist Party and its impact on the internal situation 1970-1971**

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**Abstract**--The research entitled "The political dispute between the government of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri and the Sudanese Communist Party and its impact on the internal situation 1970-1971". It includes the events that Sudan experienced during the rule of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, as well as the political conflicts between the Sudanese parties and their impact on the internal situation in Sudan, which has become a subject. The problems and instability due to these deteriorating conditions and what worsened the internal situation was the coup of the Communist Party against the Sudanese government led by Major Hashim Al-Atta. Still, that coup was ended, and those involved in the resurrection were executed.

**Keywords**--political, government, Communist, internal situation.

## **Introduction**

Sudan is distinguished by its ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, as it is considered a mini-African continent in terms of the plurality of races and tribes. Its diverse environment has been able to impose its presence and political opinion on the system of government in Sudan and has contributed to the formulation of Sudanese politics through. Its participation in political work, especially the national elite that organized Political parties and played a prominent role in Sudan's political history throughout the period extending from independence in 1956 until the military coup in Sudan on May 25, 1969. The research department is divided into two axes. The first axis came under the title of the government of Jaafar Nimeiri in 1969 and the political conflict in its era and its repercussions on the Sudanese interior. The second axis came under the political differences

between the government of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri and the Sudanese Communist Party and its impact on the internal situation from 1970-to 1971. The sources and references that were used were used. She shed light on an important period in the history of Sudan: the rule of Jaafar Nimeiri, who continued to rule Sudan for sixteen years, a period not short in the modern history of Sudan. We hope that our research will contribute to the benefit of researchers and those interested in the field of contemporary Arab history.

### **The government of Jaafar Nimeiri in 1969 and the political struggle In its era and its reflection on the Sudanese interior**

The second military coup took place on May 25, 1969, and the Free Officers Organization was standing behind it, and its rise was for many reasons, as the internal conditions in Sudan were clearly prepared to seize power and eliminate democratic institutions that were led by a civilian regime that became unable to manage things. With his loss of full social and political responsibility in the country, this led to the intervention of the army, especially the Free Officers, for carrying out that coup. The failure of the Sudanese governments at that time to solve the problem of the south, was one of the most important factors that led to the movement of the Sudanese army, and the coup was an expected and unexpected event at the same time the involvement of political parties in it. There are rumors in the first months of 1969 of a possible military coup without That the Sudanese politicians take any measure to overthrow the government. It is not expected because those who wanted to carry out the coup were living in a state of fear about the successful implementation of the coup, in addition to their fear of the consequences of the coup on their political destiny.

The period from October 31, 1964 to May 25, 1969 was a period in which the party leaders proved that they remained despite the differences and hostility between them and their struggle for power, and that the leaders of the coup accused the politicians of mismanagement and administrative corruption, and that their political position in parliamentary institutions had been reduced. It weakened before the coup, in addition to the deterioration of the economic situation, the financial deficit and the deterioration of the political situation. It was natural for the Sudanese military institution to be affected by these conditions, so I felt resentment and grumbling about that reality.

The organization of the Free Officers was affected by these bad conditions, and there were organizations for them organized by Farouk Othman Hamdallah, and the situation in the capital, Khartoum. At the time of the coup was characterized by calm, because most of the military leaders of the Sudanese army officers in the month of May of each year specifically are outside the country and that As a result of the high temperatures in their country. The Free Officers Organization found it an opportunity for the coup to take place in that month, and the coup was planning since the beginning of October of 1968, and there were meetings of the organization periodically around the coup and it was organized by the most prominent officers leaders, including Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri) ). It moderated the topic of discussion in the meeting about the coup, and one of the most prominent participants in the meeting that preceded the coup was submitted by Bakr al-Nur. Member of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Communist Party and Major

Salah Abdel Aal Mabrouk, who is the representative of the Nasserite officers in the Sudanese army, as well as three Ten officers from the organization's leaders of the Free Officers. It was there in April 1969, and the meeting was divided into two parts: the first opposed the coup and carried it out during that period, and I was among the most prominent of them, Abdel-Khaleq Mahjoub. The Secretary of the Communist Party, Babiker al-Nur and Major Abu al-Qasim Hashem, while the rest were supporters of the coup, and in fact the coup took place on the morning of May 25, 1969.

The military units participating in the coup consisted of thirteen officers and four hundred and thirty soldiers from the armored force, parachutes and infantry, and they moved within the coup plan, and chose the time when the Armored School would conduct maneuvers in the Khor Omar area north of Omdurman, and Colonel Jaafar visited Nimeiri the area to check on the course of events and to make sure that there are two units of umbrellas to support them. The leader of the coup, Jaafar Nimeiri, chose the password for the armed forces to start the coup (victory is ours), and among the two coups was Bakr Awad Allah of civilians and there were nine of The military also, who comprised the Revolutionary Command Council.

Those forces marched towards the capital, Khartoum, and cut the communication lines, closed the airport and surrounded the presidential palace and the prime minister's residence. After the success of the military coup, Babiker Awadallah read the first statement issued by the putschists, in which he confirmed the success of the operation and the seizure of power. After the coup statement, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri issued a republican decree declaring his assumption of power, declaring Sudan a democratic republic, dissolving the Council of Ministers and the civil service. The government of the revolution, represented by the person of Jaafar Nimeiri, defined its foreign policy that it will stand by the progressive Arab state, led by Egypt, in order to solve the problems that disturb the relationship of the two states. An agricultural protocol was signed between the two countries in October 1969, and Sudan participated in the summit conference The Islamic Conference was held in Rabat in September 1969, in which the (Israeli) aggression against the Arab countries was discussed, and Sudan signed the Arab Economic Unity Agreement on December 19, 1969, to unify Arab efforts for economic development. Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait and Jordan also participated, as Nimeiri signed The Tripoli Pact for the Unity of the Arab National Destiny between Egypt, Sudan and Libya on December 27, 1969. Nimeiri also contributed to resolving the crisis that occurred between the Palestinian resistance and the Jordanian forces in September 1970.

Nimeiri was one of the members of the delegation of the Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo, and he succeeded through his speech to both King Hussein and Yasser Arafat in resolving the crisis. and reflected positively on the two countries. On the internal level, the Sudanese people calmly accepted the military coup, as the Khatmiyya sect announced its support for the coup, in the person of Muhammad Othman Mirghani. With the government in which it is a partner, the result was a rebellion carried out by Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar sect, and the rebellion centered on the island of Aba. On the other hand, the delegation of (Al Hayatiyah) tribes' leaders arrived in western Sudan, along with

the Rizeigat tribes, who came from the directorates of Darfur and Kordofan, through the aforementioned events. The first is in the first military rule, so the experience of civilian rule was closer to the ambition of the Sudanese people, because they tried the military rule before and did not take it lightly.

Four months have passed since the coup, and the country is in a state of instability, as a result of the incompatibility of ideas and orientations between the members of the Revolutionary Command Council, the communists, and the Ansar sect. The Sudanese Ansar refused to get off his private boat during his visit and touring the White Nile, so he considered his dignity violated in March 1970. His reaction to this behavior was that Nimeiri gave an order to the air force to strike the island with planes, as the sources indicated that the Egyptian planes participated alongside the Sudanese Air Force in that The mission, and the result of the rebellion was that thousands of victims were killed and wounded. Imam Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi was assassinated on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border, while Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi traveled in April 1970 to Egypt and was imprisoned there, then the Vice President of the Egyptian Republic, Anwar, arrived in Sudan Sadat and Abd al-Salam Jalloud, Prime Minister of the Libyan Government and the Minister of Interior, and Nimeiri participated in order to liquidate the rebellion.

Libya used to link it with Sudan with a joint agreement in all economic and political fields, so that Sudan would not delay or stray from performing its national role towards both Egypt and Libya. A group of documents was found in the house of Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi, and it was found that he had contact with some politicians inside and outside the country, including Sharif Al-Hindi, who played a role in causing the rebellion despite his presence outside the country. The first to denounce the new regime, as they staged large demonstrations, during which their leader, Hassan al-Turabi, was arrested in the city of Khartoum. Serious facts about the Aba incident were revealed by the National Security Agency through confessions made by participants in the rebellion, as was the case for Hadi al-Mahdi. A connection with the Muslim Brotherhood as well as with other external parties at that period. The Egyptian government supported Sudan in its stance on the rebellion incident, and to confirm their strong relations, President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muammar Gaddafi visited Khartoum on May 25, 1970. And there was a wide welcome by the Sudanese people that visit. As for the problem of the south, it was one of the priorities of the revolutionary leadership government to solve it, when Nimeiri announced his goal to establish regional autonomy in the south within a unified framework for Sudan, and evidence of that when the Revolutionary Command Council was formed. Ali Abel Al-Bar, and there was support from the southerners and the northerners to solve this problem for the sake of a united Sudan.

### **The political dispute between the government of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri and the Sudanese Communist Party and its impact on the internal situation 1970-1971**

The Sudanese Communist Party played an important role in Sudanese politics, not only for its self-development, but also for the ideas and methods that spread from it, which are as follows:

- The Sudanese forces were far from addressing the modern power organizations. The Communist Party, which drew this interest from the sources of the social revolution that took place in Europe and Asia.
- Attention to the issue of development and linking it to social justice took a specific form in the communist programmes.
- Developing the external dimension in internal politics, and just as the Sudanese Communist Party influenced. The Sudanese political and trade union movement, it was affected by Sudanese politics and the Sudanese social reality and realized the importance of national loyalty as a condition for international affiliation, as well as the importance of democracy and basic freedoms as a condition for political action.

The communists had a role in the coup of May 25, 1969. Some of them even believed that the one who carried out the coup was not Nimeiri, but the Communist organization. However, Abdel-Khaleq Mahjoub, the party's secretary, remained reluctant to explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of the coup, despite the Communist Party, especially its military wing, was an authentic partner in its planning and implementation. That was with two prominent members, Hashem al-Atta and Bakr al-Nur, in the Revolutionary Command Council. The Communist Party had its own comfortable position within the new system, and it was planning to gain more power and influence in the state entity and to seize power completely.

The Communist Party divided itself into two groups, the first on the side of the government, and the opposition group was led by Abdel-Khaleq Mahjoub, who was opposed to issues related to Sudan, including its entry into the Triple Union that included it with Egypt and Libya. The dispute deepened when Babiker Awadallah stated when he visited East Berlin in October 1969 that the coup would not have succeeded had it not been for the Sudanese communists. October 1969, and in the meantime, the communists who were on the side of Abdel-Khaleq Mahjoub refused to enter into the new political organization that the government had assumed in the name of the Sudanese Socialist Union, and as a result, Abdel-Khaleq was exiled to Egypt in March 1970. November 1970 witnessed an escalation of the confrontation between the communists and Nimeiri, as Nimeiri expelled three members of the Sudanese Free Officers Organization and the Coup Council on November 16, 1970. And the civil administrative apparatus and its attack was the reason that those dismissed officers had joined Abd al-Khaliq Mahjoub, and that they were transmitting news of the Revolutionary Command Council to the dismissed communists.

Nimeiri issued a statement on February 12, 1971 accusing the communists of treason and their attempt to seize power, and that statement was broadcast to the Sudanese people in his speech that was broadcast on the radio. Destroy this alleged party. Nimeiri wanted to end the Communist Party himself and not members of it, meaning that he completely liquidated the leadership and bases, which prompted Abdel-Khaleq Mahjoub to actually think of a coup against Nimeiri and after he returned to Sudan. The intervention of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and upon his arrival in the country he was imprisoned in the Shajara military camp, But he managed to escape on June 29, 1971. Hashem al-Atta, while in the army, was able to introduce a number of leftist elements to the

Military College, to graduate officers who could be relied upon later. Farouk Othman, praise be to God, also introduced a number of communist elements to the intelligence services, and they had a prominent role in assigning an attempt The coup of 1971.

Nimeiri was acquainted with the talks that took place in Cairo through the delegation that was coming, and during that the raid was carried out by the officers who drew weapons in the face of Nimeiri and those with him in the meeting, after which Omdurman radio broadcast military music in preparation for the broadcast of Bayan Hashem al-Atta, marking the success of the operation. The military coup, and the armed forces and armored vehicles in Khartoum were controlled by the leaders of the coup, and what facilitated the coup process is that most of the ministers were outside the country. Especially Ahmed Abdel Halim, the commander of the armored corps, and the formation of the coup was later announced It was composed of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Babiker Al-Nur, with the membership of Hashem Al-Atta and Farouk Othman Hamdana Allah, who was in London accompanied by Babiker Awad Allah, and Muhammad Mahjoub Othman was in Czechoslovakia.

One of the most important decisions of the Council was the abolition of the ban imposed by Nimeiri on the Federation of Trade Unions, the Students' Union, the Youth League and the Women's Union, the coup did not receive support from the people of Sudan due to their adherence to teaching Islam. Trade unionists, such as workers and peasants, supported the coup, while Major General Khaled Hassan Abbas was one of the supporters of Nimeiri. Also, elements appeared, including the May Youth Brigades, which went out in demonstrations calling for Nimeiri's return, and the role of Major General Khaled Hassan Abbas was important as he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces since June 1970. His calls to strike the two coups were broadcast on Libyan radio. As for the Arab position on the coup, Egypt's position was marked by caution. And silence. The Egyptian newspapers at the time did not announce anything about the coup, and Sadat asked to send a delegation to learn about what happened in Sudan. The delegation arrived on July 20, 1971 in Khartoum, and Hashem Al-Atta's response was to continue relations with Egypt, with evidence that the first plane that landed at Khartoum airport was Egyptian plane and the airport was closed since the coup.

As for Libya, it supported the Nimeiri regime, and that was by forcing a plane coming from London, which was carrying Babiker Al-Nur and Farouk Othman Hamdana God, to land at Buthaina Airport in Benghazi, and it was detained by the Libyan authorities. As for Iraq's position, it was in support of the coup, After Nimeiri was detained for two days inside the Republican Palace, he was imprisoned in one of its rooms, and the coup that lasted for three days failed. Its leaders were arrested, and the death sentence was carried out without giving them the right to even a chance to defend themselves. Their trial was a formality. They are Abdul-Khaleq Mahjoub, Al-Shafie Ahmed Al-Sheikh, Joseph Garang, Hashem Al-Atta, Farouk Othman, praise be to God and Babiker Al-Nur.

Nimeiri accused the Soviet Union of being behind the coup led by Hashem al-Atta, and diplomatic relations were cut between them, as well as the relationship with

Iraq, which supported the coup and the two coups, and if we want to identify the reasons for the failure of that coup. It is the failure of the communist movement due to the absence of three important leaders and Leaders outside the country and this led to the dispersal of the perpetrators of the coup, and the coup relied on a small armored force at the beginning of the formation. Hashem Al-Atta in his coup allowed the return of the organizations that Nimeiri dissolved, and most of them were communist organizations, as there were no organizations related to parties Another. The masses of the coup raised slogans and red banners in relation to the Communist Party supporting it, making other elements of the masses supporting Nimeiri take that position in their favour. The Sudanese media focused on statements that offend the communists as infidels and atheists, and Ethiopia's position with Sudan was that it would The leaders of those fleeing towards its lands or those who carried out the coup took over. After these events, Nimeiri rose in order to prepare for a founding conference to establish a political party on which to rule. At the beginning of 1972, he put forward a formula (Sudanese Socialist Union) The Secretary of Labor Affairs in the Sudanese Socialist Union was the pioneer Zain al-Abidin Mohamed Ahmed Abdel Qader.

The mechanic's transport workers objected to the entry of this new political organization, and I submitted this with a memorandum to the Secretary of Labor Affairs in the Sudanese Socialist Union, Major Zain al-Abidin Muhammad Ahmed Abdul Qadir. The union, and also wanted to liquidate the Irrigation Workers' Union from the communist elements, so he dismissed six members of its central committee. As a result of that decision, the secretariat of the Sudan Trade Unions Federation sent a memorandum to the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform in Sudan, Abd al-Rahman Abdullah, and through all of this it is clear The Sudanese Socialist Union Party has become the only party that governs in the name of the military and is also responsible for all federations, unions and other bodies.

Through the foregoing, we see that Sudan has begun a new phase, which is the military rule and the beginning of military coups. We find that despite the different ethnic, cultural and civilizational origins from which the people's armed forces are at the fore in all ranks, what distinguishes them from other social forces is always represented in their homogeneity. The nationalist group considers it a group that interacted within it and became united after it transgressed the responsibility, so it was an occupying force of the united Sudan, after which the force charged with protecting and maintaining it from its far north to its south and from its east to its west, without discrimination, due to the fact that belonging to the armed forces was optional and the armed forces transcend over Tribal, sect, and racial connections, and the political parties in that period were in conflict with the ruling forces until it became one party in the country and it dominated the political arena, and thus Jaafar Nimeiri's rule became in the eyes of many a bloody dictatorship because he wanted to preserve the country from chaos and division.

## **Conclusion**

Sudan is a vast country that is vast and diverse, with diverse geographical and social characteristics, multicultural, ethnic and racial, in its population

gatherings and lifestyle, and rich in financial and human resources. Therefore, it was necessary to implement a system of governance that takes into account this diversity and achieves a balance in development and services and meets the aspirations and desires of citizens with different characteristics and regions to participate in Governance and attention to their local problems and serving their life issues. The instability between the elected governments and the military regimes in Sudan becomes clear with which the political experience in managing Sudan's affairs has failed, and within the framework of the power struggle after independence, the army has become the strongest and most influential political party in power and with the continuation of the political conflict between The authority and the opposition, a matter with which the state failed politically, security and economically due to the failure of development projects in Sudan, which resolved the issue of national unity towards disintegration and from The most important conclusions:

- The political system in Sudan under the leadership of Jaafar Nimeiri enjoys strong factors that made him continue in power for 16 years. One of the most important factors is the external support of the political authority in its confrontation with the opposition movements at home.
- The multiplicity of crises of the political and social conflict has prevented the exploitation of the elements of power within the political system and society in Sudan due to the failure of the state to reach the stage of political stability and national integration.
- The multiplicity of components of the Sudanese political and social structure has prevented the political and societal elites from providing the opportunity to achieve stability and development inside and outside Sudan.
- The policies practiced by Jaafar Nimeiri's government led to the dismantling of the country's unity, and this affected the national unity in Sudan and resulted in an increase in the problem of the south.
- There was more than one coup attempt against the rule of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, but it did not succeed due to the support of some parties to him, especially by the Egyptian government, which participated in ending the coup against Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri.

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