

How to Cite:

Awais, I. A., Rahim, N. R. A., Alhossary, A. Z., & Ab Rahman, Z. (2022). The Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages and its effects on the elements of Palestinian national identity. *International Journal of Health Sciences*, 6(S4), 8819–8843.
<https://doi.org/10.53730/ijhs.v6nS4.11337>

The Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages and its effects on the elements of Palestinian national identity

Ihab Ahmed Awais

Communication Program, Faculty Leadership and Management, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia
Corresponding author email: Ihab@usim.edu.my

Norhayati Rafida Abdul Rahim

Communication Program, Faculty Leadership and Management, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia
Email: norhayati@usim.edu.my

Abeer Z. Alhossary

PhD candidate of Applied Linguistics at University Putra Malaysia & a lecturer at the University College of Applied Science
Email: abarakat@ucas.edu.ps

Ab Rahman, Z.

Research Centre for Theology & Philosophy, Faculty of Islamic Studies UKM
Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia
Email: zaizul@ukm.edu.my

Abstract---The Palestinian cause is enduring some critical phases in the history of conflict against the Zionist occupation state. A vast segment of our people is vulnerable to Zionist attempts by the Zionist intelligence that target the Palestinians' national identity done by media technology specialists, and psychological tactics through social media are used to gradually remove the national identity of the Palestinians and replace it with a bogus one. Israel nowadays employs social media and frames its messages to target all the five components of the Palestinian national identity: the right of return, the right of resistance, the Arab and Islamic dimension, the Islamic and cultural heritage, and the sovereignty of the State its borders. This paper analyzed the Israeli Arabic formal social pages, namely the coordinator, Avichay Adraee, Avichay Adraee, and Israel in Arabic. The aim is to understand the media and psychological tactics used to contact the Palestinian audience. the study found precise results that the Israeli social pages run by a clear strategy to attract the Arab and

Palestinian followers and framed its media messages to attack the Palestinian national identity.

Keywords---Facebook, national identity, Israeli social media, media effects, news framing.

Introduction

In framing controversial issues and the origin of the conflict as dangerous for ordinary Palestinian citizens and exaggerated issues, we see how media outlets and political actors attempt to shift public opinion by using purposeful language. As Dennis Chong and James Druckman (2007) wrote in their seminal piece on framing theory, framing is "the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue [...]" given how the topic is characterized (p. 104).

Many researchers show that frames affect the way individuals perceive issues, it is critically important that we understand how language can affect attitudes toward conflict issues and how different frames can alter the public's perception of these topics (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Igartua & Cheng, 2010; Rose & Baumgartner, 2013; Haynes, Merolla, & Ramakrishnan, 2016). Research shows that framing tends to shift public attitudes and the public policy process, particularly agenda-setting (Eilders, 2000; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). Agenda setting is when an issue or issue frame gains salience in the media and consequently alters the political agenda (Eilders, 2000).

Today, the Palestinians are experiencing an awareness crisis like their dealings with the Israeli occupation considering the complicated political and security conditions in the Arab reality, a lack of confidence in the ruling political systems and movements, and the openness and cooperation situation between "Israel" and several Arab countries in the political, media, security, and economics. This situation was reflected in the significant divergence in the political positions of the Palestinian and Arab public regarding their status toward the Israeli occupation. That led to the emergence of new features among the Arab region, creating a normalization relationship based on distorted facts that Israeli social media have been heavily involved in managing its policy and messages.

Hence, it seems complicated to understand the dimensions of Israeli media work without understanding the general Israeli national goals and its subsidiary goals. Accordingly, a complete correlation exists between Israeli media work and those goals. In this context, the media's available portlet indicates a link between the media and its political and social environment and the frameworks governing it. Whereas the mass media are in terms of origin and professional practice, primarily national institutions, it responds to its fans' political and social pressures and expectations. Thus, it expresses the national interests identified by the actors in society (McQuail, 1994).

Bruce Williams and Delli Carpini (2011) indicate that the media is likely to harmonize with the government on the situation and policies on international

events and issues; however, the vital link between the media and the government is most visible in times of crisis. The importance of studying the coverage of the conflicts and crises in social media depends not only on their effect on the trends of public opinion towards it. In addition, however, in its direct connection to states' foreign policy, the importance of framing news media for conflict issues (Arno & Dissanayake, 1984).

In this context, Douglas (1995) notes that the media frame of foreign policy issues is issued in political and cultural ideology to promote a mental image in the public's mind towards international matters. This phenomenon is known as Domestication of News—translating news to the local audience and framing it in ways that are in harmony with the political situation and the prevailing culture in society.

Hence, we can say that the media has an essential role beyond being a source of information and opinions about specific topics. While giving priority to a particular case means attracting the audience, that plays an influential role in determining what will go through in their thoughts, focusing on specific features and their repetition and ignoring other features affects the order of importance of those features in the minds of the audience and have a central focus of interest. In this context, the study of Adnan Abu Amer (2018) revealed that the Israeli media are directly subject to the Israeli security services, and it is still a media with security implications, linked and directed, while the security factor is at the center of the paramount importance in the government's handling of its means.

Mustafa Kabha (2018) also shows that the Israeli media is seeking to instill different opinions that are distorted in the minds of the Palestinian Arab public, who has remained long exposed to the Israeli media, while no other means could counteract this resistance. Fuqaha (2003) mentioned that The Israeli media adopted, from the beginning of this conflict, basic principles in the framing coverage of its events, the most notable was (1) the human touch, to mention the names of Jewish fathers and children, which gives the human and personal nature of what it calls the Palestinian "terrorism" that Israel faces every day. Moreover, (2) rhetorical question, even Pro-Palestinians are having difficulty answering the questions addressed to them, as Israeli media speakers have approached asking more rhetorical questions that cannot be answered as part of their media efforts. Furthermore, (3) recognize a cultural difference between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Westerners find themselves close to the Israelis Since they share the same culture, traditions, and values (Abu Amer, 2018).

In the Palestinian scene, online media in general and Facebook, in particular, is the most prominent information sources for the public; Because of its features, such are the interactive and immediate transmission of events and multimedia content and facilitated access to its sites and applications on mobile devices, and the absence of any spatial or time restrictions that prevent access to it. Nevertheless, based on the social media's reliance on values and methods of work in its treatment of Arab and international issues, it is assumed that it will be affected by the prevailing political, economic, and social system as its incubator systems (Arnold and Merrill, 2004).

In recent years, many Israeli Arabic-language social media sites have spread, the follower to the Israeli affairs knows that this massive number of Israeli Arabic - speaking social media was not a mere coincidence; instead, it came within plans and strategies that reflect the Israeli view and mechanisms for defending it. Ayman Al-Rafati (2018) notes that these pages are considered a kind of psychological warfare led by the Israeli occupation state against the Palestinians and the Arabs to influence their thinking style, morale, and beliefs. Besides distorting the Palestinian resistance movements and distracting the youth from caring about their primary and national issues. Israeli Arabic-language social media has many means, the most important of them today is "Facebook" and "Twitter" when you browse it you find many Israeli Arabic social pages, you will find pages in Arabic for the President of Israel, Prime Minister, government spokesperson, and army spokesperson.

Add to this a page of "Al-Munasiq" the Israeli coordinator affairs in Gaza and West Bank, and many other Arabic-speaking social, cultural, economic, and technical pages which is run by Israelis who know what, who, why, and when to write, and attracted thousands of Palestinians and Arabs to follow it. Ideologists drive those web pages, and these ideologues espouse rhetorical messages to the Palestinian public to shape mass opinion. Ayman Al-Rafati (2018) said, "Such pages have several goals, including improving the image of occupation, and to show it differently from the reality of its practices on the ground. In addition, however, it aims to make daily communication with the Israeli directly and away from the official authorities. Furthermore, this has a security aim, which is used to obtain information and persuade and exploit victims to work with them".

Besides that, it seeks to break the Palestinian and Arab awareness and influence them by attracting hundreds of thousands of them to follow these pages. While Judaization is also considered one of its aims by spreading their propaganda, through consolidation of Zionist concepts and terms in the daily use for the Palestinians, for example, when Jerusalem is mentioned, it is called "Yerushaláyim." while when the news is published about the West Bank called "Judea and Samaria," likewise, the city of Nablus "Shechem," and the change is not limited to places; instead, the Israeli social media works to defend the Israeli tendencies by naming their army "the Israel Defense Forces," and justify the killing, displacement, and destruction that done is only as self-defense.

This was confirmed by Johnny (2003). In contrast, he mentioned that the Israeli media framed the local news by repeatedly using several selective terms to indicate and express events related to Israel's relationship with the Palestinians. It was not limited to specific terms that are used only once. Instead, it is noticed that their abundance has become constant, with frequent uses in different cases. It should be noted that the method of selectivity in citing terms is not only a media frame base but also political and ideological in its depth.

While it is noticeable in the Israeli framing style of news coverage that news processing of Palestinian resistance operations is higher than Israeli violence on several levels, extensive details related to Israeli "victims" were added. In contrast, those details do not appear about the Palestinian counterparts (Eid, 2001). The Israeli social media also frame the news image of talking about the victims by

manipulating the coverage angles, which creates an unbalance feeling in the viewer's influence between solidarity with the Israeli and Prejudice against the Palestinian (Taher, 2017). The Israeli media also aims to downplay the Palestinians as a people and disregard their narrative and suffering. Besides their traditions and customs than its facts (Neirab, 2017).

During the past two decades, "framing" has become one of the guiding theories in the study of news coverage. Framing in mass communication is about how (political) issues are presented. Thus, framing is not an activity that is limited to media actors but is done by all social actors and individuals – consciously or not. Gitlin (1980), for example, defines frames as "principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (p. 7). While De Vreese (2005: 53): "a frame is an emphasis in the salience of different aspects of a topic." The most widely cited definition is by Robert Entman (1993). He defines framing as "[selecting] some aspects of perceived reality and makes them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular definition of a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (p. 52).

While continuous media coverage of an issue can have effects on what the public deems to be essential and can consequently set the agenda, we are more interested in how Israeli social media outlets and Israeli political elites frame the Palestinian National Identity elements and how those specific frames affect their understanding for their national identity. Moreover, regarding the elements of the Palestinian national identity, we may say that many researchers sought to explore it as its bases are dispersed because many Palestinians have been expelled from their lands belong to it historically only. Thus, many researchers, including Awais (2020), Al-Qalqili, and Abu Ghosh (2012), considered that the bases of the Palestinian national identity, in general, are defined by the following five principles (1) The right to resistance, (2) The right to return, (3) Arab and Islamic dimension, (4) The unity of the land and the right to establish a state with al-Quds as its capital. (5) Palestinian cultural and historical heritage.

The Palestinian national identity is the Arabic language, customs, traditions, culture, the memory of social displacement, and the joint defeat of Zionism in all forms and ways to stand firmly in front of the fateful issues and entitlements. This is also the Palestinian's specificity and level of consciousness and learning; it is the identity of resisting the occupier as an opponent of him/her and a fighter against his/her existence. It is also a representative identity of geographically separated populations, economically different, governed by differentiated systems, and other economic systems. Yet, they have a historical origin, a memory of uprooting, a constant conflict with opponent identities.

Problem Statement

The practical difficulty embodied by the frame that is addressed or presented the issue related to the elements of Palestinian national identity in the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages poses the problem of the determinants and framing of news coverage of related topics and their role in shaping follower's opinion.

Hence, this study seeks to address the nature and limitations of news coverage for the elements of the Palestinian national identity in the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages; by identifying to what extent these pages fulfill the followers' cognitive needs, and the limits and scope of that coverage focus on specific goals and events.

It also addresses the communicator's strategy in building the news message, where he was interested in certain situations and events, and his role in developing and shaping news from its selection, sources, editing angles. Here, the study focuses on text-building strategies in terms of language choices, quotations, information, and pictures, that lead to emphasizing certain elements or aspects as opposed to neglecting other aspects; with specifying the contribution of this news structure to distorting the features of the national identity and practicing incitement against it.

As well as the extent of the propaganda dimension domination in return to the objective media dimension in dealing with the Palestinian issue, and how this daily coverage addresses the deep roots and causes of the conflict, as well as how it relates to the Palestinian national social, political, and cultural context.

Study Questions

This study aims to answer a set of questions as follows:

1. What are the most prominent topics the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages cover related to Palestinian issues?
2. What news frames deal with news of the Palestinian issues associated with elements of national identity in Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages?
3. What are the salience elements used in news frames about the Palestinian issues and related to aspects of national identity in Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages?
4. What are the most solutions frames provided by the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages about the conflict, and how they relate to the elements of Palestinian national identity?
5. What is the trend of news published about the Palestinian issues related to elements of national identity in Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages?

The theoretical framework of the study

The study adopted the Framing Theory of News frameworks Whose hypotheses can measure the contents of news coverage of various issues in the media during a specific period (Omega and Colorado, 2004) This theory assumes that events and news do not exist and do not have a specific meaning but gain their significance by placing it in a framework that defines it and gives it consistency by focusing on some aspects of the subject and overlooking other aspects of a specific case (Makkawi and Hussein, 2002).

Studies have also shown that media professionals shape the audience's knowledge frameworks and contexts, affecting how the audience perceives the content being exposed (Gamson, 1992). The literature on news framing has

illustrated its powerful effects on individuals' social perceptions and political preferences. This assumption was proven through the study of press and T.V. reports. Therefore, the choice of frameworks is essential in determining the audience's readability of topics and events.

Frame Definition

Several definitions of 'frame' and 'framing' (e.g., Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Tankard, 2001; Reese, 2001; Scheufele, 1999) share several assumptions. First, frames are patterns of interpretation through which people classify information to handle it efficiently. Second, framing emphasizes specific aspects of reality (Snow and Benford, 1988; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Reese, 2001); furthermore, specific attributions, evaluations, or decisions are assigned to recipients (Iyengar, 1991; Price, Tewksbury, and Powers, 1997; Shah, Domke, and Wackman, 1996; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).

While Goffman (1974) defines the media frame as a specific construction of expectations that the media used to make people more aware of social situations at some point, it is, therefore, a targeted process by the communicator when he reorganizes the message so that it falls into the category of people's perceptions and persuasive influences.

Thus, the journalist's news frame may have strength and importance that sometimes strips the character and personality of the journalist himself. So that in the end, he must do his job, with no distinctive features or general characteristic that distinguishes him in the selection or determine his style. In the end, he is just a gear that works in the organization's large media machine, which imposes its patterns on him during work (Braynt, Thompon, 1998).

In addition, the framework may be done by choosing specific contexts and vocabulary to describe the event, whether by intimidation or underestimation. Besides, it may be done by adding, deleting, distorting, or being allowed to mention specific details but not others; this represents a point of view so specific that what information is received is what the journalist desires, not necessarily what happened. Moreover, this may affect the public's understanding and judgment of this event (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005).

The journalist relies on a frame of reference for selecting and drafting news and focuses on these frameworks to highlight specific aspects of the reports and obscures other elements so that the news appears accurate. Still, it is not complete (Miller and Riechert, 1997).

News Frame Types

Although journalists differ in writing the news, specific frames control these different formats when talking about news frames. Much previous literature has identified a handful of commonly occurring frames in the news. Among them, Neuman, Just, & Crigler (1992) discussed comprehensively several types of frames dominantly used in U.S. news coverage: conflict, economic consequences,

human impact, and morality. Based on these frames, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) analyzed five national newspapers and television news stories in the period surrounding the Amsterdam meeting of European heads of State in 1997. They identified five predominant news frames: attribution of responsibility, conflict, economic, human interest, and morality.

1. Human interest frame: This frame "brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem." For example, in crises, the frame stimulates the psychological pulse of people, which ultimately leads them to a more negative attitude toward the situation.
2. Conflict frame: The conflict frame is used in such a way as to reflect conflict and disagreement among individuals, groups, or organizations. In the Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) study, the conflict frame was the second most common frame, and the more serious the newspaper, the more the conflict frame was in evidence.
3. Morality frame: This frame puts the event, problem, or issue in morals, social prescriptions, and religious tenets.
4. Economic consequences frame: This frame reports an event, problem, or issue in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group, organization, or country. The vast impact is a substantial news value, and economical products are often considerable (Graber, 1993).
5. Attribution of responsibility frame: This frame is defined as "a way of attributing responsibility for [a] cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group" (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 96).

Explaining framing mechanisms

When we talk about the frame news mechanisms, Entman (1993, p. 52) suggested that frames in the news can be examined and identified by 'the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.' Along these lines, Shah et al. (2002, p. 367) refer to 'choices about language, quotations, and relevant information.' Gamson and Modigliani (1989) identify 'framing devices' that condense information and offer an issue's media package.' They identify (1) metaphors, (2) exemplars, (3) catch-phrases, (4) depictions, and (5) visual images as framing devices.

The most comprehensive empirical approach is offered by Tankard (2001, p. 101), who suggests a list of 11 framing mechanisms or focal points for identifying and measuring news frames which are: (1) headlines, (2) subheads, (3) photos, (4) photo captions, (5) leads, (6) source selection, (7) quotes selection, (8) pull quotes, (9) logos, (10) statistics and charts, and (11) concluding statements and paragraphs. In addition, among the Frame Mechanisms, there are Contextualization, Personalization, Dramatization, Fragmentation, Normalization, Dehumanization, Demonization, Equalization, and Sanitization (Bey, 2014).

Methodology

This study is considered a descriptive-analytical study. It analyzes all the topics presented on the Facebook pages of the Israeli Arabic-speaking and its links to

the elements of the Palestinian national identity. Determining its type, content, style, and forces actors, based on the content analysis methodology, which is considered the most suitable scientific method suitable for descriptive studies; as it is a practical, systematic effort to obtain data, information, and descriptions of the phenomenon to gain complete insight into the aspects of the situation, content analysis approach has been adopted to describe in terms of subject and form of topics related to the elements of Palestinian national identity and highlighted by the study sample to understand the quality and quantity of news coverage and answer the study questions.

It also uses some procedural tools for analyzing the semantic structure of the Palestinian issue coverage and its intellectual, emotional, and behavioral dimensions. Whether by looking at the accompanying evidence or using the comparison method between the different Facebook pages and the reflection of the personal aspects and how they used their Facebook pages to express the official Israeli position.

The research community and sampling

The study community includes two parallel directions; the first will analyze the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages. The study will focus on the page of " the coordinator (Almunaseq), Avichay Adraee, Gendelman, and Israel Arabia" on Facebook. The comprehensive sample will be used for 30 days during the period specified in the timeframe to limit all topics highlighted on their pages and deal with the Palestinian issues related to the elements of the Palestinian national identity. In the same direction, the study will look into the posts published on these pages to know the direction's trends regarding the Palestinian national identity elements.

Timeline frame

The timeline for the study extends for eleven months from 5/2019 to 3/2020. Therefore, the study aimed to list all the materials that accompanied the most prominent occasions and events during this period, which were two weeks of the month 5/2019, that accompanied the coverage of Nakba what called (independence day of Israel) and transportation of The American embassy to Jerusalem, and a week from 1/2020, which accompanied the announcement of the American century deal, and a week from 3/2020, which attended the repercussions of the spread of the Coronavirus in the occupied territories.

Data collection tool

The content analysis tool will be used qualitatively to view the content as a reflection of more profound phenomena to reach general observations on the material's properties. Furthermore, this is done by identifying and planning units, standards, and categories of the tool to determine news coverage frames for Palestinian national identity in a representative sample of Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages through:

Analysis Unit: The news article published on the Israeli Arabic-speaking Facebook pages.

II. Unit of Measure: The news topic related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Palestinian national identity issues.

III. The following categories identified analysis categories:

1. The type of conflict issues category related to the Palestinian national identity; was divided according to the most prominent events. Such as transferring the American embassy to Jerusalem at the same time it was the anniversary of the occupation of Palestine (Nakba) and the declaration of independence for Israel state, the American deal of the century, the crisis of the spread of Coronavirus. And compare what was published with the five elements of the Palestinian national identity: "the Arab and Islamic dimension, the right to resistance, the right of return, the right to establish a state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the cultural and historical heritage.
2. The news source category was divided into several limitations like as an opinion of the page' owner, an international agency, a local Israeli agency, an Israeli T.V. channel, a Palestinian television channel, Israeli newspapers, Arab newspapers, Palestinian newspapers, Israeli websites, and Jewish eyewitness's Palestinian websites, Arabic Internet sites, Arab eyewitnesses, Military spokesperson, a government spokesperson, an official Palestinian source, and Palestinian factional source.
3. The direction of the news category: It was divided into Positive, Negative, and Neutral.
4. The frames news used category: It was divided into morality frame, conflict, responsibility, human interests, economic consequences.
5. The category of professional rules governing news writing practice.

It was divided into:

- a. Balanced: It was measured through the text of the news, which includes various views on the news topic.
- b. Unbalanced: It was measured through the news text, which included one point of view and no other on the news topic.
- c. Objective: It was measured through the text of the news planned in its natural scientific context that includes the event, its source, time, and location and is devoid of the opinion of its author regarding the news topic.
- d. Unobjective: It was measured through the text of the news that includes the subject of the event, its source, time, and location, adding in its formulation the opinion of its author regarding the news topic.
- e. Neutral: It was measured by the formal elements used to produce the news for an artistic purpose, and not for ideological bias and political, intellectual orientation, such as the shape of the news frame, the size of the headline, and highlighting some news no other, and choosing the accompanying picture related to the context of the news topic.
- f. Biased: It was measured through the formal elements used in producing the news for ideological bias and political, intellectual orientation, such as framing a story without another, Increasing the font size of specific titles and selective in highlighting some news no other, and the selection of

suggestive pictures accompanying the report, the details of which are consistent with the intellectual orientation of the page, even if they are not related to the news topic, besides the biased formulation of the news title and text.

Findings

Question One: Media Contents and Issues

| MEDIA CONTENTS | TOTAL | PERCENTAGE |
|--|-------|------------|
| The Security Doctrine and deterrence force | 541 | 23.71% |
| Coexistence and Peace | 521 | 22.8% |
| Religious Interaction | 240 | 10.50% |
| Cultural interaction (Art, music, literature) | 303 | 13.30% |
| The Holocaust Genocide | 57 | 2.5% |
| Political Diplomacy | 291 | 12.8% |
| Technological Superiority | 190 | 8.3% |
| Military Superiority | 300 | 13.10% |
| Child and Women Affairs | 71 | 3.10% |
| Arabian internal Affairs | 156 | 6.80% |
| Call for People's Reaction | 334 | 14.60% |
| Day-to-day life documentation of the State of occupation | 283 | 12.40% |
| Stealing language and heritage contents | 195 | 8.50% |
| Tampering with the Arabian and Islamic surroundings | 252 | 11.0% |
| Raising Doubts about the Resistance | 402 | 17.60% |
| Claiming the Historical Jewish existence in Palestine | 156 | 6.80% |
| Human Rights | 11 | 0.50% |
| Non-Jewish residents of the State of Occupation | 168 | 7.40% |
| The Jewish People | 167 | 7.30% |
| Language and Religion | 77 | 3.40% |
| War Scenarios | 98 | 4.30% |
| Tourism Openness | 83 | 3.60% |

The figures above are extracted based on the total number of posts rather than the number of contents, as sometimes a single post may consist of multiple media contents. The findings of the content category show a split in terms of the attitudes of media content related to the study. Therefore, the military doctrine representing power and conflict has the highest frequency rate of 23.7%, followed by the coexistence and peace category with a slightly lower percentage of 22.8%. Thus, these two categories are contradictory, which shows that the language of the media content is divided between peace and war. Nonetheless, the military attitude and force and conflict still dominate the Israeli media discourse where raising doubts about the resistance reached a high percentage of 17.6%. In comparison, the military superiority category reached 13%. These percentages collectively make up 54.4% of the total media content percentages.

However, religious interaction and shedding light on religious occasions reached 10%, the cultural exchange, which sheds light on art, music, and literature, reached 13%. Language and religion as media content reached 3% in the same context. Among the high percentages is political diplomacy, which reached 12.8%, while inviting people to react and express their opinion reached 14.6%. Regarding the contents relating to Palestinian national identity, raising doubts about the resistance came at the top of the contents followed by documenting the day-to-day life in the State of occupation, tampering with the relationship with the Arab and Israeli surroundings, stealing contents of heritage, and finally, claiming the historical Jewish existence in Palestine. The contents will be discussed in the section about the relation of these contents with the components of the national identity.

In summary, it is noticed that media contents reflected excessive polarization when dealing with the issues. Hence, there is an inclination toward power, deterrence, adopting the security doctrine, reaffirming military superiority, and using contents of raising doubts about the resistance. On the other hand, there has been a call for coexistence, peace, religious and cultural interaction, highlighting common points in both language and religion and calling people to participate by expressing their opinions. Indeed, these are efforts to identify the masses' attitudes towards the issues or even agitate them, which is a good reaction for the Israeli media. Sometimes, a mere response serves as a basis for dealing subconsciously with the contrary.

Question No. Two: Media Frames

| Media Frames | Total | Percentage |
|-----------------------------|-------|------------|
| Human Interest Frame | 673 | 29.5% |
| Conflict Frame | 612 | 26.8% |
| Ethical Frame | 362 | 15.9% |
| Economic Frame | 298 | 13.1% |
| Social Responsibility Frame | 337 | 14.8% |
| Total Posts | 2282 | 100.0% |

About media frames, the human-interest frame came first with 29.5%. This frame humanely plans media discourse and contents using interesting, emotional, and dramatic methods.

However, the conflict frame came second with 26.8%. Then, the frame reflects force and war contents followed by the ethical frame, which reached 15.9%, the social responsibility frame with 14.8%, and finally, the economic frame with 13%. These percentages indicate that the existing frames strive to attract the masses, manipulate emotions, and link the occupation and the Arab and Palestinian individual using emotional techniques and contents that highlight mutual benefits or those that use violence and conflict as their basis. It is important to note that conflict frames were used only in the relationship between the occupation and the Palestinian resistance factions, Hezbollah, Iran, or even the peaceful boycott movements. In various forms, the occupation used a language that separates between an ordinary Arab individual, non-partisan Palestinian, and resisting and anti-occupation individuals. Thus, the language used to

converse with the "peaceful" Arab and Palestinian adopted the economic frame such as benefits and economic merits, future economic projects. It may also use the humane interest frames, such as shedding light on compassionate and emotional incidents and sympathizing with affairs and concerns of the Arab world. It may even use the ethical frame that renders the occupation as interacting with the humane cases and striving to help the elderly, children, women, and patients. Finally, the social responsibility frame is another valid option for the Israeli media to blame the victim for what happened, such as the deprivation of the victim's rights and theft of its properties. This frame was manipulated particularly to urge the Palestinians to stop supporting any anti-occupation activities that may affect their economic or humane situation, cause the demolition of their houses, and confiscate their properties. This type deludes the victim into thinking it handles the aggressor's intellectual and material dispossession.

Question No. Three: Elements of Display

| Elements of Display | Total | Percentage |
|---------------------------------|-------|------------|
| Video | 553 | 22.3% |
| Audio Recording | 30 | 1.2% |
| Live Video | 197 | 7.9% |
| Natural image | 111 | 4.5% |
| Proverbs, supplications, idioms | 174 | 7.0% |
| Maps and graphics | 238 | 9.6% |
| Interviews | 23 | 0.9% |
| Adding persons | 188 | 7.6% |
| No Display | 32 | 1.3% |
| News quotes | 241 | 9.7% |
| On-site images | 695 | 28.0% |

On-site images have the highest rate of 28%, with a considerable difference compared to video, which reached 22%. There is a vast difference between the two percentages and the display elements whose percentage did not exceed 10%. These findings indicate that the focus on video shows the attention of makers of the Israeli social media to the importance of video, animation, spoken information, and the role of these media, which influences the masses more than images do. Also, a video has the feature of multiple views contrary to posts or pictures, let alone that it includes various elements of fascination and impact in terms of images, music, words, and design patterns which leave the viewer's conscience vulnerable, even if this were just the first step toward penetrating the viewer intellectually and socially.

On-site images reflect the media's attitude toward supporting and reaffirming its credibility by attaching the events and occasions with images containing several contents. These images often reflect force, pride, superiority, sympathy, and pity. These would be positive expressions that aim at reaffirming the Israeli inner nature and convey it to the Palestinians and Arabs in a way the occupation wants the world to perceive it as powerful, militarily, technologically, ethically superior; which is humane with children, elderly, and women even if these were

Palestinians; tolerant with minorities and other religions, and one that receives sympathy and support internationally at various levels even from religious figures. However, on the other side of the coin, all these messages represent treason to the Palestinians demeaning their qualities and a sign of their imperfections that justify the occupation's aggression against the Palestinians.

Question No. Four: Proposed Solutions

| Proposed Solution | Total | Percentage |
|-----------------------|-------|------------|
| Peace and coexistence | 816 | 35.8% |
| Force and wars | 873 | 38.3% |
| No solution | 593 | 26.0% |
| Total | 2282 | 100.0% |

Based on the analysis, it is found that peace and coexistence mean that the Arabs neutralize with the occupation and the Palestinians comply with it. This is done by forsaking the basis of the Arab and Islamic character, accepting the occupation as a superior power both militarily and technologically, refraining from protecting the intellectual and historical heritage and leaving it vulnerable to the occupation to steal it, such as accepting that Tabbula, Arais, and Baglawah are the components of the eastern Israeli kitchen, Al-`aud is one of the Israeli musical instruments, visiting the State of occupation, congratulating them and wishing them the best wishes are peaceful acts. However, these acts are losers and negatively affect the Palestinian national identity.

Nevertheless, regarding the force and wars as a proposed solution in the posts of the sample, this solution belongs to those who reject and resist the occupation peacefully and militarily, through demonstrations or weapons. From the occupation viewpoint, this solution questions the value of the land as a reference for the Palestinian character and the purpose of resistance as a title for the Palestinian daily life.

Therefore, regardless of the solutions the occupation proposes, they are not positive according to the initial meaning for the components of the Palestinian national identity even if the words of peace and coexistence deliver a positive meaning; these words call for giving up resistance and surrendering. Force and war may seem harsh and painful, but it is the most honest expression of the occupation and its function as a solution. It is a solution despite its brutal reality. It urges the Palestinians to preserve their identity and humiliate the occupation, and it is a relentless demand for the Palestinian's right to survive.

Question No. Five: Effect of Media Contents on the Components of the Palestinian National Identity

| Components of the Palestinian National Identity | Its Opposing Media Contents | Total | Percentage |
|---|---|-------|------------|
| Sovereignty and Borders of the State of Palestine | Documenting day-to-day life in the occupation state (Jerusalem and areas of 1948) | 283 | 12.4% |

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|--|-----|--------|
| | Human Rights | 11 | 0.5% |
| Total | | | 12.90% |
| Cultural and Historical Heritage | Stealing language and heritage contents | 195 | 8.5% |
| | Woman and Child Affairs | 71 | 3.1% |
| | Religious interaction | 240 | 10.5% |
| | Cultural interaction | 303 | 13.3% |
| | Call for interaction and sharing opinions | 334 | 14.64% |
| Total | | | 50.04% |
| The Arab and Islamic Dimension | Tampering with the relation with the Arab and Islamic surroundings | 252 | 11.04% |
| | Coexistence and peace (neutralization) | 521 | 22.83% |
| | Political Diplomacy | 291 | 12.75% |
| | Arab internal Affairs | 156 | 6.84% |
| Total | | | 53.46% |
| The Right of Resistance | Raising doubts about the resistance and its objectives | 402 | 17.62% |
| | The Security doctrine and Deterrence Force | 541 | 23.71% |
| | Technological Superiority | 190 | 8.33% |
| | Military Superiority | 300 | 13.15% |
| Total | | | 62.81% |
| The Right of Return | History of Jewish Existence in Palestine | 156 | 6.84% |
| | The Holocaust Genocide | 57 | 2.50% |
| Total | | | 9.34% |

In this section, media contents have been analyzed according to their effects on the Palestinian national identity. Based on the findings, it seems that the contents aimed at the Palestinians' rights came at the top of the other contents and reached 62.8%. One of the unique contents was the security doctrine and deterrence force, which got 23.7%, followed by raising doubts about the resistance and its purposes, which reached 17.6%, military superiority, which reached 13%, and finally, the technological power gained 8%.

It is important to note that this result is expected because the occupation relies on force and deterrence, and the fundamental of its existence is improving its military power. So, if the occupation previously relied on creating balance in deterrence to weaken the resistance, today it uses various contents to raise doubts about the resistance. Sometimes, the occupation considers the resistance as being recruited by countries outside the Arab region and has extensive agendas. Sometimes, the occupation considers the resistance a threat to the Palestinians' safety and economic security. It is the main reason for the siege of Gaza, arrests in the West Bank, and the closing down of the border crossing before the worker's patients and travelers. The occupation also blames the

resistance for the humane imbalance of the Palestinians, as if the occupation's aggressions were just rational and justified reactions.

Even in the other component titled "The Arab and Islamic Dimension," media contents that adopted a destructive policy often intercepted the first component. Thus, it showed that the countries that have abandoned fighting and neutralized attained peace, stability, and growth more than other nations that opted to resist and ended up stuck in civil wars. Also, the attitudes of media contents are initially divided into two directions, internal, which is mainly related to the Palestinian resistance, and external, which is related to the Arab and Islamic relation with the Palestinians.

To further explain the media contents that are related to the Arab and Islamic dimension, which reached 53.50%, focusing on coexistence and peace as a concept has the highest rate 22.8%, where common denominators with the Arab surroundings have been confirmed as well as peace treaties and neutralization and the new era after the war with the occupation state. Political diplomacy came second with 12.8%, and then the media content that tampers with the relation with the Arab and Islamic surroundings by shedding light on the meetings with the Arab delegations, religious figures from Arab and Islamic states who confirmed peace and disowned wars, let alone the reference to sport and economic activities that bring the Arab and Islamic countries and the State of occupation together. Moreover, the occupation exploited Arabic and Islamic occasions to indicate the daily life in Arab states and exchange best wishes between the nations that represent Arabian and Islamic backgrounds and among administrators of media pages. Moreover, this includes the particular focus on the unique messages that are sent by few in the Arab world or posted to express their admiration of the State of occupation, who wish to live there, and affirm the coexistence of the Arabs with the occupation at the expense of the Palestinians' right.

In the third position came the contents of the cultural and historical heritage where the relation between the Arabic language and Hebrew has been indicated, urging Arab masses to learn words in Hebrew, words that are used to express circumstances and occasions and to use these words. Some heritage contents have been stolen, such as costumes and traditional dishes. The occupation even claimed that Arabic idioms and proverbs could complement its history and heritage. The content of calling people to interact and express their opinions to the page administrators attained the highest rate with 14.6%, aligning with creating these pages that strive to bridge the relations with nations and individuals in the Arab world from the official channels. Next, the cultural interaction, which used art, music, and literature contents, came with 13% and was followed by the religious interaction such as sending best wishes in celebration and Islamic occasions and holy days. All best wishes have been used to confirm that resistance has nothing to do with Islam as Islam denounces violence, and thus, Palestinians ought to quit resistance. These pages did not miss any religious occasion without shading lights on them and their features to the Palestinian Arab residents in the State of occupation.

In the following position came the contents of the sovereignty of the Palestinian State, which did not exceed 13%, and the last part came the right of return of 9%. It is noticed that media pages intentionally and ignored any terminologies of the Palestinian sovereignty or terminologies that consider the Palestinians as an independent entity or those that consider them separate groups with a leadership. Also, there was no explicit reference to the right of return; the occupation considered the occupied Arabic villages in the 1948 region part of the Jewish history and thought the return marches as suicidal gatherings for misleading the youths to bogus purposes. Therefore, the occupation did not use any names to refer to these gatherings as they are under the occupation or affiliated to the Palestinian authority administration. Instead, it considered them just Palestinian residents who could be residents in the occupation state and not in the Palestinian lands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The occupation also reaffirmed that the way the Palestinians express their rejection of the occupation shows they are mere vandals and chaotic terrorists that the occupation is so compelled to take measures against, such as minimizing their fishing areas, closing down border crossing and tightening the siege to discipline and deter them, when in reality it is abusing them.

Regarding the relationship between the media terminologies of the study with the Palestinian National Identity

| Components of the Palestinian National Identity | Media Terminologies that oppose the components | Total | Percentage |
|---|---|-------|------------|
| Palestinian State and its borders | Judea and Samaria | 167 | 7.3% |
| | Jerusalem | 256 | 11.2% |
| | Palestinian Residents | 301 | 13.2% |
| Total | | | 31.70% |
| The Cultural and Historical Heritage | Hebrew and Arabic/ Music/ Cooking/ Arts | 280 | 12.3% |
| | Israeli Democracy | 200 | 8.8% |
| | Women and Child Affairs | 71 | 3.1% |
| | Islamic Teachings and The Religious Interaction | 108 | 4.7% |
| Total | | | 28.90% |
| The Arab and Islamic Dimension | Fellow (Muslim/Christian) | 122 | 5.3% |
| | Arab Troops | 59 | 2.6% |
| | The Middle East | 98 | 4.3% |
| | Muslims | 81 | 3.5% |
| | Arab neighboring Countries | 144 | 6.3% |
| Total | | | 22.00% |
| The Right of Resistance | Terrorism and Terrorist Groups | 497 | 21.8% |
| | Vandals/ Anarchists | 155 | 6.8% |
| | Common Enemy | 113 | 5.0% |
| | The Humane Army | 225 | 9.9% |
| | Nation Defenders (The Israeli Defence Army) | 534 | 23.4% |
| Total | | | 66.90% |

| | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|-----|--------|
| The Right of Return | The Single Jewish State | 324 | 14.2% |
| | Minorities in the State of occupation | 132 | 5.8% |
| | The Jewish People | 167 | 7.3% |
| Total | | | 27.30% |

This section is the core part of the whole analysis where the frequency of the terminologies was calculated. These terminologies were used in all the pages of the study sample and sorted according to their correlation with the Palestinian national identity. Previous studies conducted on these pages and their attitudes and objectives were used to identify these correlations while confirming that the Israeli social media targets the Palestinian national identity the same way it targets other Arab and national identities and the same way it supports its occupational objectives. Some of these objectives include reaffirming the Jewish nature of the State of occupation, establishing its historical roots in the land of Palestine, and portraying its image in the media as one of the natural elements of the political element of the Middle East. This is done while deliberately hiding the Palestinians and their right of existence, the right of return, the right to rule, and ultimately possess the land.

The terminologies clearly showed that such terminologies that relate to the right of Palestinians to resist came first, with 66.90% of the wording. These were clear, very frequent, and explicit as terminologies of terrorism and terrorist groups were used to repeatedly refer to the Palestinian resistance factions in Gaza, West Bank, and the exile 21.8%. Palestinians who participated in the return marches and West Bank were called chaotic and vandals 6.80%. Posts and contents were repeated on all pages and daily. These glorify the Israeli army, describing it as the army of pride, power, dignity, and bravery, not to mention posts of the army's training and war scenarios, role, and latest weapons with 23.40%. Contrary to the demonized resistance factions, the Israeli army was considered a humane army with 9.90% whose humanity is less intense than its aggression and solidity. Unfortunately, the Arab and Palestinian media intentionally ignore this aspect. Still, it is the other authentic face of the State of occupation as claimed by media pages.

In the second place came the terminologies that aim at the Palestinian identity and its limits. As we previously mentioned, according to the Palestinian national identity, Palestine from the sea to the river is agreed-upon entire Palestine. Also, Palestine and its West Bank and Gaza make up the current temporary form of the known State. The occupation ignores Palestine and instead uses Judea and Samaria to refer to the West Bank. This is an official Israeli term used to refer to the West Bank. According to the Israeli classification, Judea and Samaria is an administrative region that includes all West Bank except eastern Jerusalem. Judea extends south Jerusalem, including Gush Etzion (in Bethlehem district) and Mount Hebron (Hebron Governorate). In contrast, the Samaria region refers to north Jerusalem especially (Nablus and Ramallah).

In the same category, the occupation seized Jerusalem in the media and, in reality, using its Hebrew terminology Jerusalem besides other terminologies such

as the capital of the State, capital of the State of Israel, Jerusalem. These terms were included in the same category with 11%. The terms Eastern Jerusalem, Western Jerusalem, the borders, the Palestinian State, and Palestinian authority were never used in the target pages. At the same level of negligence, Palestinians were considered a group of homogenous humans who had no ruler or lacked legal or administrative association. They are thought to be just Palestinian residents or just residents with 13%. This terminology has been used when addressing any reaction from the Palestinians, such as traveling abroad, exporting, or importing goods, during arrests, raids, and confiscation, or when managing farmers, traders, doctors, and other professional groups.

Later, terminologies of the cultural and historical heritage came with 28.90%. These terminologies stole the Hebrew language, music, cooking, and arts with 12%. They attributed them to the occupation, thus stealing heritage from the locals such as the Palestinian `Arais, Kunafah, Arabic coffee Hummus, and Tabula. The occupation was also considered a reference to women and children 3% and a base for democracy with 8%. Islamic teachings and religious interaction with 4.7% were used in two directions. The first was to attract the Arab masses and display a bogus image of coexistence and false peace. The second was to question the legitimacy of resistance and its religious reference. Also, it is possible to see the tampering with language, music, cooking, and arts in this category. All these elements were included within a single frame, which lifted the rate of the category.

There is no difference between this category and the category of the terminologies of the right of return, whose percentage reached 27%. In this category, the occupation ignores the Palestinian history while confirming the only Jewish state 14% and the originality and the deep roots of the Jewish people 7.30%. The State of occupation referred to minorities in the state 5.8% such as Duruz, Bedouin, Arabs, and Circassia but less than it did with the Jewish people and the nationalism of the Jewish State. The findings come in line with the attitudes of the previous studies. They also show the occupation neglecting Palestine as a Palestinian heritage, removing it from people's memory and replacing it.

The last percentage is the Arab and Islamic dimension, which is often associated with the historical and cultural heritage of shading light on language, arts, and cooking. Also, it is related to religious interaction as most of the Dakwah posts were directed to friends of the page from Arab and Islamic countries with 5%. Moreover, news and Arab internal affairs with 2.6% and individual media stances toward the Palestinian cause were used to undermine and weaken the relationship among the Palestinians and their Arab and Islamic surroundings. It was repeatedly confirmed that the State of occupation is part of the Arab and Middle Eastern surroundings with 4.3% and that it shares with them the same enemy with 2.6%.

In summary, the terminologies used to touch on the Palestinian national identity in-depth manipulate the notion that Palestinians are an affiliate of the occupation the benefits of establishing relations between the Arabs and Muslims with the State of occupation. They also promote the history and heritage as eternal and not a result of the occupation. In addition, they reaffirm that the most significant

concern of the State of occupation is the resistance and anyone who opposes the occupational agenda.

General Findings

1. The findings show that Israeli social media relies on the policy that aims to divide the identity of the Palestinian people to fragment the Palestinian identity further. There are Palestinian residents, Arab minorities, and Palestinians in Gaza, and there is no mention of any Palestinian outside the borders of occupied Palestine.
2. The Israeli social media uses its terminologies and concepts to tamper with the historical, religious, intellectual, geographical, and demographic milestones and strive to remove the Palestinians from the Palestinian land altogether.
3. The Israeli social media strives to question the resistance, existence, and legitimacy. Thus, it classifies the resistance as a tool for vandalism, chaos, and destruction. The occupation also considers the resistance as manipulating the youths' minds, turning them into a tampering instrument that brings every loss to the Palestinian individual personally, psychologically, and economically.
4. The Israeli media manipulate the differences between societies and exploits crises for its interests; thus, it highlights the demolition in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon while intensively flattering its structure as it is a superior state that is democratic and respects women's rights, has the creative atmosphere for children, its army is humane, has technological and military innovations, and extends a helping hand to the Palestinians. Any positive aspects are removed from the Arabic communities. Any declarations or stances that oppose the Palestinian cause are used and emphasized to strain the relationship with the Arab surroundings and renounce disunity.
5. When confronting the Arabs and Palestinians, the Israeli media places two rationales. The first states, "the occupation offers me what my country does not," and the second is "whoever stands before the occupation will be destroyed." These two rationales resemble the carrot and stick approach, which aims to create Arab and Palestinian generations so submissive to the enemy, obedient to the occupation, and perceives the occupation as a role model while feeling ashamed of its authentic Arab, Islamic and Palestinian community.
6. The Israeli media always communicates with the masses and all their segments and needs, accepts insult and criticism, or more correctly absorbs that. It also appraises any positive means of communication, such as sending best wishes and particular messages. It also does not let any occasion go by without asking the people about their opinions and using tricky questions to attract their subconscious minds to a gray area where the occupation becomes the victim to the resisting Palestinian.
7. The Israeli media took advantage through its coverage of the disunity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a result, large segments of Palestinians have opened up to the Zionist community and developed working and interest-based relations with it. This is an effort to support communication between the Palestinians and the occupation to accomplish their daily official transactions to reconstruct the national conscience differently, which

renounces resistance and helps the culture of neutralization and coexistence with the occupation.

8. Israeli pages focus on removing historical milestones and target anything that confirms any link between Palestine, its people, and Arab and Islamic identity. They emphasize relations between the Jews and Palestine. These Zionist attempts extended to include arts, heritage and monuments, and everything that reaffirms the relationship between the land and the Palestinian individual. It has even come to claim that some clothes and traditional Palestinian dishes are related to the Jewish Zionist movement. The Zionists tried to present Palestinian dishes and costumes on some occasions, such as Nakba Day, which they perceive as "the Independence Day.

Conclusion

The Palestinian cause is enduring some critical phases in the history of conflict against the Zionist occupation state. A vast segment of our people is vulnerable to Zionist attempts by the Zionist intelligence that target the Palestinians' national identity. This is not only a military assault but a somewhat deeper assault where Zionist experts, media technology specialists, and psychological tactics through social media are used to gradually remove the national identity of the Palestinians and replace it with a bogus one.

So, the danger that threatens the Palestinian identity is not confined to removing the Palestinian national identity from the people's memory but focuses on turning the Palestinian national identity into an Israeli, Zionist, and Hebraic one. It targets all the five components of the Palestinian national identity: the right of return, the right of resistance, the Arab and Islamic dimension, the Islamic and cultural heritage, and the sovereignty of the State and its borders.

Thus, national institutes and decision-makers should strive to preserve the Palestinian Arab identity for the coming generations. They may accomplish this by either establishing independent institutes for Palestinian youths which try to provide services for the Palestinian citizens apart from the temptations of the occupation or by increasing the cultural activities and restoring the history which brings back the Palestinian cultural and historical heritage in particular. This includes encouraging people to wear the Palestinian Thoub or other activities that support the Arabic language, the spirit of the national culture, the political identity, and the only cause of confronting the occupation and nourishing the Palestinian identity. Therefore, it is necessary to link the objective, form, and content of youth innovations with the components of the national identity. Consequently, this national burden makes it essential for the Palestinian youths and the national and social institutions, especially one that operates in the Palestinian societal field, defending Palestinian refugees and Palestinians in exile and placing them permanently in the front line against the Israeli political literature.

The Palestinian resistance and its forms are essential for preserving the national identity and confronting the occupation by instilling the national concepts to plan a national approach to protect the national identity from the occupation's

aggression. This requires all national forces to come together to confront the Zionist aggression against our cause politically, intellectually, culturally, and educationally and at all levels.

Thus, it is crucial to comprehend that the psychological activities that the occupation carries out through its media and social media, such as the page of Zionist coordinator and the occupation state spokesperson Avijaa Adraei and Israeli in Arabic, are nothing but a continuation of the Zionist policy of targeting the Palestinian national identity by implanting wicked concepts that serve the occupation and its narrations.

References

1. Abu Amer, Adnan. 2018. The ideology of the Israeli Media in Covering the Palestinian Issue, Al Jazeera Center for Studies.
2. Al-Qalqili, Abdul Fattah and Abu Ghoush, Ahmed. 2012. *The Palestinian National Identity, the Formality Privacy, and Organizer Framework*. Badil: Palestinian Center for the Palestinian residency and refugee rights.
3. Al-Rafati, Ayman. (2018). The "Arabic" Zionist Pages, an attempt to improve the occupation's image. basaer-online. (Entry date: March 2020): shorturl.at/bqS56.
4. Arno, A., & Dissanayake, W. (1984). *The News media in national and international conflict*. Boulder: Westview Press.
5. Awais, Ihab. (2019). The Conceptual Development of the Palestinian National Identity. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)* Volume 24, Issue 11, Series. 7 (November. 2019) 69-79.
6. Bey, Ahlem. Media framing theory, media theories, and communication, (entry date: March 22, 2020: <http://constantine3.blogspot.com/2014/01/frame-analysis-theory.html>
7. Black J. Braynt, Thompon J.S., "Introduction to Media Communication," New York, McGraw Companies Inc, 5th Eds (1998): p30 .0.
8. Cappella, J. N. and Jamieson, K. H. (1997). *Spiral of cynicism. The press and the public good*. New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Chong D, Druckman JN. 2007. A theory of framing and opinion formation in competitive elite environments. *J. Commun.* In press.
10. De Beer, Arnold S., and John C. Merrill (eds) (2004) *Global Journalism: Topical Issues and Media Systems*. Boston, MA: Pearson.
11. De Vreese, Claes. (2005). News Framing: Theory and Typology. *Information Design Journal*. 13. 51-62. 10.1075/idjdd.13.1.06vre.
12. Douglas, S. (1995). The framing of race progressive. 59 (12),19.
13. Eid, Basem, "Crossfire in Words: Covering the Palestinian and Israeli Media for the Intifada," *Al-Raqeeb Magazine*, Jerusalem, 2001, p. 28.
14. Eilders, Christiane. (2000). Media as political actors? Issue focusing and selective emphasis in the German quality press. *German Politics*. 9. 181-206. 10.1080/09644000008404613.
15. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58.
16. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43, 51_58.

17. Gamson, W. A. And Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95,1_37.
18. Gitlin, T. (1980) *The Whole World Is Watching Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*. University of California Press, Berkeley.
19. Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
20. Goffman, Erving (1974). *Frame Analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
21. Graber, D. (1993). *Mass media and American politics*. Washington, DC: C.Q. Press.
22. Haynes, C., Merolla, J., & Ramakrishnan, S. (2016). *Framing Immigrants: News Coverage, Public Opinion, and Policy*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Retrieved March 23, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/10.7758/9781610448604
23. Hepsiba, N., Subhashini, A., Raju, M., & Rao, Y. P. (2018). Changing role of teachers in the present society. *International Journal of Health & Medical Sciences*, 1(1), 35-38. <https://doi.org/10.31295/ijhms.v1n1.37>
24. Irons, Imad Hassan, Mr. Laila Hussein ,Communication and contemporary theories, the house of the Egyptian Lebanese (Cairo ,(2002 ,p.(350 - 8 34)
25. Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
26. Kabha, Mustafa, "The Hebrew Media and Its Role in the Intifada," *Israeli Issues*, Issue 4, October 2001, p. 120.
27. Laurent Ucker, Ernie Wiggin, "Making Connections: Framing as a Discursive Strategy of Realer Response to Newspaper Coverage of Allusion Wedding," (Paper presented to the Inaugural Conference for the Center of Mass Communication Research), University of South. October 14, 1997: p 3.
28. *Lifen Cheng, Juan José Igartua, Elena Palacios, Tania Acosta, and Socorro Palito*, Framing Immigration News in Spanish Regional Press, *International Migration*, 52, 6, (197-215), (2010).
29. Mansour, Johnny, "Selective Conventionalism in the Hebrew Newspapers," *Israeli Issues*, Issue 9, January 2003, p. 88.
30. Mark Miller, Bonnie P. Riechert, "Concept Mapping and Framing Analysis of News: Linking Traditional Conceptualization to New .01 Quantitative Method" (Paper presented to the Inaugural Conference for the Center of Mass Communication Research) University of South. October 12 - 14, (1997): p3.
31. McQuail, D. (1994). *Mass communication theory: An introduction*. London: Sage Publications.
32. Neirab, Basil, "The Israeli Media: Realistic Models to Cover Up Political Crises, The Global Campaign to Resist Aggression, December 27, 2010, (Entry Date: March 2020): http://ar.qawim.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7681
33. Neuman, W. R., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. N. (1992). *Common knowledge*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
34. Nidal Fuqaha, (2003). Israeli Media Priorities, *The Journal of Israeli Scene*, Issue 25.
35. Olga Baysha Omega and Kirk Hallahan Colorado, Media Framing of the Mkrainian Political Crisis 2000-2001, *Journalism Studies*, vol. 5, No. 2, 2004, pp. 233-246.

36. Pan, Z. and Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse. *Political Communication*, 10, 55_75.
37. Price, V., Tewksbury, D., and Powers, E. (1997). Switching trains of thought: The impact of news frames on reader's cognitive responses. *Communication Research*, 24, 481_506.
38. Reese, O. H. Gandy, and A. E. Grant (Eds.) *Framing public life. Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world* (pp. 95_106). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
39. Reese, S. D. (2001). Prologue _ Framing public life: A bridging model for media research. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, and A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing public life. Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world* (pp. 7_31). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
40. Rose, Max, and Frank R. Baumgartner. "Framing the poor: media coverage and U.S. poverty policy, 1960-2008." *Policy Studies Journal*, vol. 41, no. 1, 2013, p. 22+. *Gale Academic OneFile*, Accessed March 23, 2020.
41. Scheufele, B. (1999a). (Visual) Media Framing und Politik. Zur Brauchbarkeit des Framing-Ansatzes im Kontext (visuell) vermittelter politischer Kommunikation und Meinungsbildung. In W. Hofmann (Ed.), *Die Sichtbarkeit der Macht. Theoretische und empirische Untersuchungen zur visuellen Politik* (pp. 91_107). Baden-Baden: Nomos.
42. Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda-setting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. *Journal of Communication*, 57 (1), 9–20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9916.2007.00326.x>
43. Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. *Journal of Communication*, 50(2), 93–109.
44. Shah, D. V., Domke, D., and Wackman, D. B. (1996). 'To thine own self be true.' Values, framing, and voter decision-making strategies. *Communication Research*, 23, 509_560.
45. Shah, D., Watts, M. D., Domke, D., & Fan, D. (2002). News framing and cueing of issue regimes. Explaining Clinton's public approval despite the scandal. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 66, 339–370.
46. Snow, D. A. And Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. *International Social Movement Research*, 1, 197_217.
47. Stefaan Walgrave, Peter Van Aelst, The Contingency of the Mass Media's Political Agenda Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory, *Journal of Communication*, Volume 56, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 88–109, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00005.x>
48. Taher, Moaz, "How did the Israeli media follow the assassination of Mazen Fugaha?" Shehab Agency, March 25, 2017 (entry date: March 2020): goo.gl/aQydHJ.
49. Tankard, J. W. (2001). The empirical approach to the study of media framing. In S. D.
50. Widana, I.K., Sumetri, N.W., Sutapa, I.K., Suryasa, W. (2021). Anthropometric measures for better cardiovascular and musculoskeletal health. *Computer Applications in Engineering Education*, 29(3), 550–561. <https://doi.org/10.1002/cae.22202>
51. William A. Gamson, "Talking Politics," New York, Cambridge University Press, (1992).

52. Williams, B., & Delli Carpini, M. (2011). *After Broadcast News: Media Regimes, Democracy, and the New Information Environment* (Communication, Society and Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511846366.
53. Yehudith Auerbach, Yaeli Bloch- Elkon, " the Media Framing and Foreign Policy: The Elite Press Visavis ... U.S. Policy in Bosnia, 1992-1995". *Journal Of Peace Research*, (2005): 42 (1), P 83-99.