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## **The COVID-19 pandemic emergency for the doctrine of asymmetric warfare**

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**Abstract**---Several countries that have involved the military in handling Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) have been relatively successful. The authors researched the doctrine of asymmetric warfare during the COVID-19 pandemic emergency. The Indonesian government assigns the Indonesian National Army (TNI) during an emergency. Help to support the smooth circulation of fulfilling the population's basic needs, cross-regional population transportation, crime is not widespread, offices continue to run with restrictions on the number of people working, and the economy recovers quickly. This research framework uses moral philosophy. Deontological views and utilitarianism become the main assessment instruments to build the doctrine of asymmetric warfare. This research uses a case study approach. The study results show that the Indonesian people see the emergency condition of the COVID-19 pandemic as an asymmetrical warfare. The government is aware of the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic occurring at various government levels in terms of spread, duration, and number. All resources are used to deal with COVID-19, including the military, because civil society does not have many facilities and capabilities of TNI personnel. The Doctrine of Asymmetric Warfare in the Emergency Period of the COVID-19

Pandemic: Condition (uncertain), Areas of totality, Command flexible, Organization (unclear), Control shared, Interoperability strength and, Society-limiting time and space, abbreviated CACOCIS. TNI involvement in handling COVID-19 as a Military Operation Other than War (MOOTW).

**Keywords**---asymmetric warfare, ethics, COVID-19, emergency, military doctrine.

## Introduction

World Health Organization (WHO) noted that on August 12, 2022, the number of sick victims due to the COVID-19 pandemic was 585,950,085 cases, of which 6,425,422 died (WHO, 2022). Seeing the number of victims is so large reminds researchers of the two world wars. There is no official statement from anywhere that the COVID-19 pandemic is that we are at war. Maybe only President Joko Widodo equates handling the COVID-19 pandemic with war. The war in question is asymmetrical. The President conveyed this when giving the mandate as inspector of ceremonies to commemorate the 76th Anniversary of the TNI at the Presidential Palace, Jakarta, Tuesday (5/10/2021). "Right now we are still in the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic. If it is like a war, fighting the current COVID-19 virus is like a protracted war," said Jokowi (Farisa, 2021). Even though the trade war between the United States and China has not ended, the situation is getting worse with the COVID-19 pandemic (Sinha & Sinha, 2020). Finally, the trade war can also be understood as part of asymmetric warfare.

Protracted war and extensive non-state involvement are the main characteristics of asymmetric warfare. The state no longer determines strength in terms of posture, strategy, and rules of the game. For this reason, looking at the instrument and the number of victims, the researcher calls the COVID-19 Pandemic an Asymmetric Warfare. Because the threat of using non-state actors is increasingly involved and has non-conventional weapons, state power must be asymmetrical. (Eckert, 2020). The phenomenon in the future will repeat itself so that the doctrine of asymmetric warfare becomes essential to understand. The emergency period of the COVID-19 pandemic in a country is quite challenging to study because no country is ready to face it yet (Ji et al., 2021). Starting from the Wuhan City Health Commission, on December 30, 2019, he referred to him as a pneumonia patient of unknown cause. January 7, 2020, named 2019-nCoV, a type of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and influenza, finally given the name COVID-19 (Bogoch et al., 2020).

COVID-19 is a systematic spread of disease (Cascella et al., 2022), although its magnitude and impact vary from country to country (Hannah Ritchie, 2020). In the pre-crisis and crisis period, the community was less responsive, and the government was less consistent and ignored important information (Subroto et al., 2021). Certain countries immediately *lock down* and do not involve the military Indonesia is not in lockdown, but the military is at the forefront during a state of emergency. Using military assets and personnel is essential because some facilities and functions cannot be performed by civilians (Djalante et al., 2020).

The success of treatment depends on all parties, knowledge, attitudes, and practices (Azlan et al., 2020).

There is no solid evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic is war. Octavian (2021) looks at COVID-19 from three perspectives (academics, government, and military) and concludes that COVID-19 is not a weapon of mass destruction (Octavianus, 2021). However, The theory of weapons of mass destruction dates back to 10,000 BC; human ancestors started hunting animals using poison on the tips of their arrows. Every beast has poison; they fight using venom. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are embedded in various conflicts today. (Michael A. Gropper MD, 2020), (Clark & Pazdernik, 2016). The explanation of the virus as a weapon among the military is not uncommon, and it is natural for countries to find it easier to involve the military in dealing with COVID-19 than not to involve them. Today, COVID-19 looks like any other infectious disease. The population infected with COVID-19 is so large that it causes the highest mortality but is not counted as the highest cause of death compared to SARS and Ebola (Wilder-Smith, 2021).

Every country is working hard to involve political and military capabilities in dealing with strategic threats to find the right solution (Barry R. Posen, 2014). The response of democratic countries is less effective at the beginning of the crisis, and mortality is greater than that of less democratic countries (Cepaluni et al., 2021). Militaristic countries generally see COVID-19 as a state threat and counter this threat by involving the military. Military involvement in every operation places fair moral equality as essential (Weiner, 2017). If non-state actors play a more significant role in the armed and lethal mass conflict, the ethics of war should be reviewed (Heinze & Steele, 2009). Meta-ethics through a naturalistic approach is sometimes more appropriate to understand the underlying morals. Cognitive understanding is carried out systematically and experimentally to gain a broader objective understanding and eliminate moral errors (Wilson, 2017). The study of ethics in practice is related to morality and doctrine if morality is metaphysical while doctrine is strategic and tactical. Involving the TNI in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic has become a dilemma because of the COVID-19 pandemic because it affects the professionalism of soldiers in carrying out their primary tasks (Menko & Fitri, 2020). Ethical justification of military use by rationalizing policies in the choice of approach (Robert et al., 2020).

Asymmetric warfare also requires unconventional weapons and tactics, such as those associated with guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks. Asymmetrical warfare occurs between opposing forces that differ significantly in military strength ( Merriam-Webster Dictionary ). Andrew JR Mack's (1975) explanation of asymmetric warfare in "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" in World Politics as a term for a new type of war. In 2004, the United States Military Academy used the term Asymmetric War. This type of war is related to guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism. However, in 2010, the US Department of Defense called it Irregular Warfare (the USA, 2010). Other terms that equate these are proxy war, cyber warfare, information warfare, mindset war, paradigm battle, and others. The development of this concept of war is no longer a reaction of the weak state against the strong state, but the design of the state and

non-state affects both state and non-state, so it is crucial to understand the doctrine of asymmetric warfare well.

### **Materials and Methods**

The primary foundation of the doctrine, apart from proven experiences, is the teaching of ethics and morals. Ethics is a branch of philosophy that studies humans' moral or immoral actions. Ethics comes from the Greek word "éthos," which means the habit of guiding people to arouse conscience in action. Deontology and utilitarianism are ethical foundations that influence acting decisions (Tseng & Wang, 2021). In health, ontology focuses on the patient, while utilitarianism focuses on community satisfaction (Mandal et al., 2016). Deontology is identical to the works of Immanuel Kant (1724–1806). Deontology is a normative theory in which choices in actions are allowed, permitted, and prohibited—according to moral values as a measure of right action (Alexander, 2021). While utilitarianism was pioneered by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) by prioritizing benefits, good actions bring maximum benefits. Utilitarianism refers to the hedonism of Epicurus (341–270 BC) (Driver, 2014).

Immoral acts involve trust, and immoral actions destroy trust (Baier, 1986). Weak moral understanding due to the inability to experience shame and its implications for social networks; morality shows human qualities. Building an ethical culture means balancing the desire for profit with ethical responsibilities toward society (OC Ferrell, 2011). Ethics not only know what is right and wrong but also guides the quality of life for the better. Efforts to awaken a conscience are built to build a good culture. Culture is the ultimate judge; it provides direction in life. Shame-based morality acts serve to contribute to culture. (Baur & Wettstein, 2016). Unjust life practices will cause moral and social chaos in the life of a country (Melé et al., 2006).

The main difference between democratic and totalitarian governments lies in tolerance limits. Democratic countries accept all differences without seeking ideological justification, while totalitarian states are intolerant of differences, and state decisions become instruments of truth (Maxim, 2014). However, even though it is a product of democracy, it is also totalitarian when justifying legal reasons. The falsehood of democracy can occur when the political elite and the political system no longer consider the people's interests (Fenton, 2018).

A safe and smooth general election is not a guarantee for the implementation of democracy. The military deployment through the rule of law and the decision-making process can define whether a government is democratic or not. Military deployment considerations and environmental demands also consider the facilities and capabilities of the soldiers. Soldiers' abilities also vary, not only soldiers who are prepared for combatants alone. TNI soldiers who handle COVID-19 are qualified doctors and medical personnel. TNI Commander Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto said 988 medical personnel were spread across 109 hospitals to deal with COVID-19. According to a member of Commission I in People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), Yan Parmenas

Mandenas asked for the distribution of TNI medical personnel throughout Indonesia (Wilfridus Setu Embu, 2020).

The policy of using military force is through the government's internal processes and looking at public opinion before it is decided; the use of military force is also part of the democratic process. We must distinguish between what we intend and what we predict. Losses will occur if we predict beyond what we want (Hull, 2000). Although the goal is to save society in general, everyone thinks and sees it from different perspectives and interests. There are limits to the sacrifices that morality requires, even though we do everything we can to do good. The finite moral requirement to forbid action unconditionally can be explained by ordinary common sense. Morals are in their interest; maybe goals and activities have value. Morality must be found in the agent's interest; moderate will promote subjective superiority and try to avoid its negative implications. (Kagan, 1989).

Warfare and military morale are always changing. Debate and change can still be understood within a meta-ethical framework (James Connelly, 2018). Fighting fairly and behaving ethically is a reflection of the military of developed countries. The demands of the military community must have high morale, and if the behavior violates ethics and law, it will damage the soldiers' credibility (Carrick et al., 2018). These moral standards bind the meaning of higher moral standards. Several scenarios show the military bound by high moral standards but sometimes going too far. Commanders must advise troops to practice high moral virtues, and subordinate soldiers will be punished if they commit violations (Ficarrotta, 1997).

In general, the moral purpose of man is for good. In the study of mental health, the relationship between values, culture, and ethics is based on the principle; of respect for others, doing good without harming others, and acting fairly (Tseng & Wang, 2021). Unlike the technocrats involved in the military, they explain that technology has changed the type of war, killing remotely and in large numbers, so military doctrine has changed. If the doctrine changes, then military ethics will also change automatically. The development of military technology shows that the distance between combatants and non-combatants is increasingly blurred. Thus, the involvement of engineers and scientists in military service influences ethical values and beliefs, the role of gender perspectives, and technical issues. (Hersh, 2021). The moral implications of using a science and technology approach make us versatile, and we justify our intentions and actions (Nambisan, 2017).

Humanism and oral studies determining the value of good and evil can be found in empirical research (Ellemers et al., 2019). Moral values in the behavior patterns of each country are different, including the culture of building its military doctrine (V, 2020). In social morality that comes from custom, the object and subject are individuals and the local community because custom only applies in certain areas, meaning it is not universal. Moral is a practice of goodness tested in a society's cultural history. Respect for local culture is an ethical imperative (Chattopadhyay & De Vries, 2013). Sir Julian Corbett called doctrine the soul of war, the power multiplier. Military organizations that struggle to implement them consistently will gain greater strength in the battle (Sloan, 2019).

For the United States military, the doctrine will guide soldiers in action and become an instrument of community support for military action in achieving goals (U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 2017).

Doctrine is a guide on what to do, but it is not dogmatic as the user constantly evaluates the doctrine despite the threats arising from a dynamic environment. Environmental changes will occur, especially the development of science and technology, enemy and friend strategies, military traditions and culture, expert views, and government policies (Ubayanto et al., 2020). The TNI doctrine is referred to as "Tri Dharma Eka Karma," or abbreviated as Tridek, which means three-dimensional devotion to one soul, determination, and fighting spirit of the TNI (TNI Commander Regulation, 2010) (Panglima, 2018). This TNI doctrine must be able to synergize both the doctrine and the national defense strategy called "Sihankamrata" (Perpres RI, 2008), the TNI Army Doctrine "Dwi Bhakti Eka Dharma," the Jalesveva Jayamahe Naval Doctrine, the Air Force Swa Bhuna Forced Doctrine, and Defense Doctrine. Non-military Dwi Bhakti Eka Darma. The doctrine of State Defense is a guideline for implementing national defense (Permenhan RI, 2014).

Researchers take a case study approach with three steps : (1) observing events directly and exploring social media as a whole. At first, the researchers conducted observations and interviews; at the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), Wisma Atletes, which hosted the most COVID-19 in Indonesia, and the TNI Headquarters Health Service. (2) discussions to explore topics and cross-check sources manually or face to face. Social media tracks through Google to find the data needed to use the phrase; military morality, military doctrine, COVID-19, military involvement in non-war operations, times of crisis, and military strategy theory. (3) construct findings to explain the doctrine of asymmetric warfare.

### **The Doctrine of Asymmetric Warfare Condition (uncertain)**

The Indonesian government views the COVID-19 pandemic as an uncertain condition and has handled it exceptionally. Indonesian President Joko Widodo, on March 2, 2020, announced that Sita Tyasutami and Maria Darmaningsih had the first and second patients of COVID-19, which had begun to spread in Indonesia. Indonesian Minister of Health Terawan Agus Putranto said the two residents were exposed to the *coronavirus* from a Japanese citizen who lived in Malaysia and had traveled to Indonesia to attend a nightclub event. In other cases, there are many clusters from various communities. The public's response to the (Tuasikal, 2020)(Tuasikal, 2020)spread of COVID-19 varies. According Slavoj Žižek there are five stages; rejection, anger, bargaining, depression, and finally accepting (Slavoj Žižek, 2020). According to Yuval Noah Harari (2020), during the COVID-19 emergency, we face totalitarian surveillance and community empowerment(Ambedkar, 2020). Military involvement in handling COVID-10 during an emergency is significant because no civilian agency is more prepared than the military (Djalante, Lassa, Setiamarga, Sudjatma, & Indrawan, 2020)

A state of emergency ( *staatsnoodrecht*) in constitutional law consists of "limited emergency" and general emergency, both official and undeliverable. Article 12 of the UUD 1945 (Indonesia's constitution) is a "state of danger," and Article 22 mentions "urgent matters." When the escalation gets wider, at the same time, the capacity and carrying capacity are not ready; Finally, an emergency arises. Number 23 of 1959 concerning the Determination of Hazard Conditions consists of; a state of civil emergency, state of martial law, and state of war. Then, Law No. 27/1997 on Mobilization and Demobilization stated "a state of danger." In Humanitarian Law relating to war, we know the terms *Jus ad Bellum* or Just of War and *Jus in Bello* or Just in War. In this perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants; Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a war.

The Indonesian government limits the entry and exit of foreign nationals and Indonesian citizens traveling abroad. Since January 18, 2020, immigration authorities have carried out health checks at various points at the airport, on land, and at ports, using body temperature scanners (Redaksi, 2020). Existing temperature gauges do not appear capable of detecting and limiting its spread. The government and society, from the beginning, understood the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic as a multidimensional problem. The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia is not the only instrument in policy-making, although the main problem is health. On July 13, 2020, the Ministry of Health issued the Decree of the Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia Number Hk.01.07/Menkes/413/2020 concerning Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). With these guidelines, it is hoped that all agencies can cooperate with the Ministry of Health. Simultaneously, Indonesia's macroeconomic vulnerabilities were also seen in that period, where the movement of the Rupiah exchange rate against the US Dollar ranged between Rp. 14,000 to 16,000 (*Indonesian Rupiah 2022 Data*, 2022). The period from January to July 2020 can be called a crisis emergency for Indonesia.

### **Areas of totality**

No remote area can be free from the threat of COVID-19. The TNI has a command system prepared to coordinate with various agencies. The TNI coordination system has received praise from the President for supporting other agencies in dealing with COVID-19. The Central Java Provincial Government involved the TNI in the Jogo Tonggo program. This program aims to build synergy between the TNI and the community in various fields of activity, including the response to COVID-19. This program is expected to suppress the spread of COVID-19 and create sustainable cooperation (Windiyawati & Tawas, 2021). The task of the Banjarmasin Provincial Government in handling COVID-19 is more on service operations and assistance tasks. TNI officers must have an appropriate time limit to avoid abuse of authority (Hayat et al., 2022) .

According to Professor of Political Science at Gajah Mada University Cornelis Lay, the role of the TNI is the task of military operations other than war, which has been practiced in various countries, especially humanitarian missions, including significant disasters such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Purwo Santoso, Chancellor of Yogyakarta Nahdlatul Ulama University (UNU), said military experience is

needed to deal with disasters like COVID-19. TNI has neat management, command management, division of tasks, knowledge-based management, and intelligence information. (Nurhadi Sucahyo, 2020) .

Opinions that disagree with the involvement of the TNI's role in handling COVID-19, Firdaus Ferdiansya in the press conference "Explanation of the COVID-19 Report Study: Strength and Role of the TNI in Responding to the COVID-19 Pandemic"; asked the government in dealing with COVID-19 to be more democratic. Handling COVID-19 inhumanely, for example giving sanctions to customers by doing *push-ups*, saluting the flag, and so on. In fact, for the TNI, this method is also intended to instill the value of nationalism in society. The deployment of the TNI in handling the pandemic began when elements of the TNI/Polri entered the Covid-19 Handling Task Force ranks. However, Firdaus said the TNI/Polri had been involved quite far, for example, by being close contact with tracing officers and enforcing health protocols (Ramadhan, 2020).

Reactions from several intellectuals also emerged because the Indonesian Minister of Health and the Head of BNPB were both from the TNI. However, as head of state, the President is responsible for protecting all citizens, so it is natural to see the COVID-19 issue within the framework of national defense. Differences of opinion in a democratic country are natural; however, public safety is more important. (Eckert, 2020). Because the involvement of the TNI in handling crises is essential, it needs to be supported by regulations related to TNI assistance tasks (Fitri, 2020). If the coordination between the TNI and the community can be protected, then the coordination between regions and agencies can be overcome.

### **Command flexible**

Presidential Decree Number 11 of 2020 Determination of the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Public Health Emergency has implications for the strategies and policies of government agencies. Very flexible strategy in asymmetric war conditions. Central government affairs include strategic policies and operational issues, while technical matters are left to local governments. Similarly, health affairs are usually under the ministry of health; Transportation matters are the affairs of the Ministry of Transportation, but in times of crisis, it is uncertain and must be flexible. Likewise, budget issues must be flexible. Law Number 2 of 2020 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2020 concerning State Financial Policy and Financial System Stability in Handling the 2019 Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19) Pandemic and Presidential Instruction Number 4 of 2020 concerning Refocusing Activities, Budget Relocation, and Procurement of Goods and Services in the Context of Accelerating Handling of COVID-19 to determine budget priorities for handling COVID-19. The budget is directed to finance the completion of COVID-19 and its impacts (Irman & Darmawan, 2021).

The TNI has multilevel lines of command, there is no specific order to take over the duties of other agencies related to COVID-19. However, the TNI has a legal basis for the TNI's involvement in handling the COVID-19 pandemic if it is included in the asymmetric war category; there are at least five rules. legislation;



- First, the 1945 Constitution describes the Universal People's Defense and Security System or abbreviated as Sishankamrata. The constitution provides an essential and structural basis for carrying out duties. The TNI is tasked with ensuring the sovereignty of the state on land, at sea and in the air. Each force is divided into the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which are tasked with fostering in accordance with existing doctrines in carrying out their roles and functions as a state defense system led by a TNI Commander and the President who holds the highest power.
- Second, Law Number 34 of 2002 concerning National Defense. This law provides the basis for the TNI to carry out the duties of OMSP. In addition, this law explains that in addition to the TNI as the main defense force, there are also reserve components and supporting components. The involvement of all potential defenses in the national defense system.
- Third, Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces explains the types of CSOs. This assignment was initially seen as a secondary task, but the development of the task appears to support military warfare operations (OMP) duties. Because in the task of war, in addition to killing the opponent with a weapon, it also hinders the movement of the opponent by increasing public awareness. During this campaign, there were those who argued that democracy was backward, so that if it was associated with the Covid-19 Task Force, it would be irrelevant.
- Fourth, Law Number 23 of 2019 concerning the Management of National Resources explains the Reserve Component to enlarge and strengthen the TNI as the main component. Then, the Supporting Components increase the strength and capability of the TNI and Reserve Components. Thus, the TNI has a legal basis for involving the community and the means to carry out military operations tasks other than war.
- Fifth, Law Number 24 of 2007 concerning Disaster Management does not assign TNI institutions directly to work. However, the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency is an active TNI, so the agency coordinates directly with the TNI. The clause in this law describes the problem of non-natural disasters, including pandemics and disease outbreaks. This law clarifies the division of responsibilities between the central and local governments.

Seeing the development of the impact of COVID-19, President Joko Widodo has officially designated COVID-19 as a national disaster. This determination is stated through Presidential Decree (Keppres) of the Republic of Indonesia Number 12 of 2020 concerning the Determination of Non-Natural Disasters for the Spread of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) as a National Disaster (Agus Wibowo, 2020). For the TNI, this phenomenon is not only a health and economic problem but has become a threat of asymmetric war.

### **Organization (unclear)**

There is no single agency dealing with COVID-19. If COVID-19 is considered a mere health problem, the Indonesian Ministry of Health is the responsible institution. However, realizing the complexity of the problem, both strategic and tactical. In an emergency, it seems that no organization is perfectly prepared, the

TNI is only a last resort. Starting to pick up Indonesian citizens who are domiciled in Wuhan using planes, equipment and medical personnel from the TNI. Likewise with the handling of the first cases that emerged, the Indonesian government tried to track down residents who had direct contact with patients by involving the Police, TNI, Regional Government, and community leaders.

Then, one by one the community members began to fall, finally reaching a peak in July 2020, until around 40,000 people were exposed to COVID-19 every day (CNBC Indonesia, 2020). Due to the high number of residents who are optimistic about COVID-19 and exceed the capacity of the hospital, emergency tents were built in every hospital and public place by involving all government agencies and public places. Wisma Atlet is the most significant COVID-19 isolation site in Indonesia, and Wisma Atlet has a capacity of up to 24,000 patients. The change in the function of Wisma Atlet to a special COVID-19 hospital involves the Minister of BUMN, TNI Headquarters, Minister of Health, Minister of PUPR, and Head of BNPB. For the procurement of medical devices using *Corporate Social Responsibility* (CSR) funds from State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) (Ronal, 2020).

Responding to the development of the spread of COVID-19 and its implications for social, economic, and community welfare aspects, the Indonesian government established a Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19, chaired by the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency. (BNPB) Lt. Gen. Doni Monardo based on Presidential Decree (Keppres) of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2020. The Deputy Chair of the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19 is the Assistant Operations Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces and Operations Assistant to the Chief of the Indonesian National Police. The dominance of the leadership from the TNI has implications for the deployment of TNI members in the regions, so that the organization for handling COVID-19 is unclear.

Seeing the condition of the leadership and the irregular organization, the government finally took emergency steps. Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 41 of 2020 concerning the General Policy of National Defense in 2010–2014, the problem of COVID-19 is a potential threat, and can be the basis for determining a national disaster. In essence, COVID-19 is interfering with Indonesia's national goals; state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security. COVID-19 threatens the safety of the Indonesian people. The COVID-19 pandemic has implications for the widening of the budget deficit to 6.34 percent of GDP, as stated in Presidential Decree No. 72 of 2020 (D. A. K. RI, 2020).

### **Control shared**

Due to the unclear organization and the spread of control over efforts to contain COVID-19, the control and responsibility of the organization are divided. Basically, health agencies are the backbone of management in overcoming health problems, but operational implementation needs coordination with other (Hafrida et al., 2021). For this reason, it is necessary to look at broader responsibilities from the perspective of national defense. If you look at the concept of a national defense strategy, it can be described with three essential substances. First, the

purpose of the state is to maintain and protect the sovereignty of the state, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation. Second, means (national security) in the form of defense resources that are used to achieve the goals and objectives to be achieved, by deploying military defense which is synergized with non-military defense. Third, relevant concepts and methods by considering the threats and strengths they have (K. RI, 2015). This means using resources to achieve strategic goals or objectives, namely planning, preparing, and implementing the national defense system. As the main component of the national defense system, the TNI is fully involved in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

The relationship between the TNI and the people is not only limited to regulations but also has a tradition. The TNI has a Code of Ethics "Sapta Marga" and "Eight Obligations of the TNI" which are the moral basis for the TNI to act. For example, in point eight of "Eight Mandatory TNI, it reads "to be a role model and pioneer in efforts to overcome the difficulties of the people around him (See;Mabes TNI, 2022)." The inherent relationship between the TNI and the people has become the TNI itself . History records that the TNI came from the people's army, and the TNI together with the people fought to defend the country. There is no change in basic education and the development of TNI traditions so that the internal order of values and behavior of the TNI still maintains the people as elements of the universal people's defense and security forces. On the basis of law and morals, the TNI controls each other with regional leaders in stages in a state of emergency or peace. At the provincial level, the TNI has command at the Regional Military Command (Kodam) or the Military Resort Command (Korem). At the district level, the military has a Military District Command (Kodim), at the sub-district level it has a Military District Command (Koramil) and in the village there is a Village Development Officer (Babinsa).

### **Interoperability strength**

Development of defense forces based on threats. The White Paper of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense (2015) describes the characteristics of threats to state sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the nation which tends to be asymmetrical (Prashanth Parameswaran, 2021) . The symmetrical threat in question is a foreign military force that enters the territory of a country illegally either through invasion, sabotage, espionage, or is supported by rebels or terrorists. In contrast to the asymmetric threat, enemy and friend are not clear and enter all aspects of life. It is a very complex multidimensional, military, non-military that can be classified as a factual and non-factual threat. (Indonesia, 2015). The Buku Putih shows Indonesia's perception of asymmetric threats openly. However, the form of threats, both asymmetric and symmetrical, is related to the existence of sovereignty, territory, and people, which are objects that must be protected. The concept of asymmetric warfare does not show the boundaries between military and non-military despite threats. The TNI's assignment in handling the COVID-19 pandemic is a function of the state system.

President Jokowi emphasized that fighting the COVID-19 pandemic is like a war that drains energy, mind, mentality, and fighting spirit. A war that requires

vigilance, speed, synergy, and the use of science and technology (Hayat et al., 2022). The President appreciated the great role of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) in the successful handling of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia; "Our success in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be separated from the great role of the TNI. The TNI, which always shows professionalism in every assignment, individual capabilities, unit capabilities, the use of science and technology, including defense equipment, has been used and deployed in carrying out every given task" (Humas, 2020).

This President's statement is an assessment submitted to the public so that all levels of society can understand it. The perception of COVID-19 as war relies on the TNI because it has discipline, mastery of technology, and high enthusiasm in carrying out its duties as a mainstay. The TNI as a government institution is not the sole actor, but in an emergency, it can interoperate with various forces in society. The TNI is in planning and budgeting under the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, while operational orders for OMP and OMSP are under the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Each batch can perform this task independently or together. For example, the Navy also took the initiative to establish a special hospital for handling COVID-19 (Yeremia Sukoyo, 2020).

### **Society-limiting time and space**

When and where the start and end of the COVID-19 pandemic depends on society. The government does not provide certainty when the COVID-19 will end; Until now, the process of transmitting COVID-19 is still ongoing. In accordance with the definition of an extraordinary public health emergency which is characterized by the spread of infectious diseases or bioterrorism that poses a health hazard and can spread throughout the region or across countries (Undang Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 2018 Tentang Keekarantinaaan Wilayah, 2018). Seeing the provisions of this article, the community becomes the instrument of this health emergency.

In the same situation, when the WHO intervention asked the Indonesian government to *lock down* as a solution, Indonesia did not fully follow. Another consideration is that the wheels of the Indonesian economy must run. China is the first to lift the *lockdown* (Sakti, 2021). In the early stages of following these recommendations, compliant countries managed to curb the spread of COVID-19, but these measures have destroyed the core pillars of the modern world economy. (Ibn-Mohammed et al., 2021). Regional and provincial-level lockdowns also have political and economic implications. For example, in Papua Province, people are prohibited from going in and out. Airports and ports are closed to enter the province; of course, it will create opportunities for the separatist movement. Although this issue was denied by the Head of the Papua Provincial Transportation Service, Recky D. Ambrauw, he emphasized that there were no plans to close airports and ports. At least it shows a group of people who want the closure of airports and ports (*Pemerintah Provinsi Papua*, 2020).

The President's directive shows the order and confirms what the TNI has done to be involved in resolving COVID-19. The signal given by the President is beyond the standard view that TNI operations other than war must prioritize civilian

departments/institutions. However, in this condition, the TNI shows war in the form of asymmetric warfare. The TNI does not only face conventional wars against foreign militaries, but threats that disrupt the safety of the nation are part of the TNI's duties that have developed according to TNI traditions.

The TNI's involvement in the COVID-19 pandemic crisis took various forms. The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) is one of the countries that takes a leading role in overcoming the democratic leadership that has limited military duties in civilian life. The tradition of involving the TNI in dealing with disaster problems is caused by internal and external factors. Factors from within themselves because they consider the main task other than war, namely helping local governments. Although there is no direct order from the TNI Commander, this task is closely related to the duties of TNI units at every level. From the external aspect, the community views the TNI as a qualified organization in terms of personnel capabilities, equipment, and loyalty to the community. From the description above, it can be described the Doctrine of Asymmetric Warfare;




Figure 1. The Doctrine of Asymmetric Warfare in Emergencies

Uncertain conditions are the first step to an emergency. In an emergency, the command will be flexible in coordination, and territorial boundaries will be uncertain. If orders are flexible, the result is unclear organization and divided control. Likewise, if the area and time cannot be limited, then it all depends on the community. The meeting point between government and society is the power of integrability; In Indonesian tradition, it is called gotong royong. Pancasila is the foundation of the Indonesian state; according to the founder of the Indonesian nation, Soekarno, the point is cooperation.

## Conclusion

The TNI succeeded in supporting the resolution of the Pandemic-Covid-19 problem because the Indonesian government placed the COVID-19 pandemic as an asymmetrical war. The doctrine of asymmetric warfare, which was initially based on guerrilla warfare, turned into a flexible doctrine in dealing with state

threats together with the people. Signs of asymmetric warfare start from the uncertain situation, then inadequate facilities, services, funding, and regulations. The doctrine of asymmetric warfare can use a deontological approach because it follows the state constitution, regulations, and TNI traditions based on the universal people's defense and security system. The doctrine of asymmetric war can also be seen from the aspect of utilitarianism because the TNI does what is beneficial for society and the state.

This incident is a valuable lesson for the world community in involving the military in dealing with asymmetric threats. The involvement of the TNI in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic is a MOOTW's task. The TNI has succeeded in becoming a leader in times of crisis because it is supported by conditions, traditions, regulations, and interoperability of cooperation. Understanding a condition is a political decision of the state, and a democratic government makes joint decisions through hierarchical legal procedures as a product of the state. The TNI's involvement in asymmetric crises is controversial, but with the TNI's ability to place itself in critical emergencies, it is respected by the government, the public, and academia.

Military morality in the division of tasks between civilians and the military in normal state conditions has been well regulated. However, strategic and tactical policies are needed to deal with the threat of asymmetric war. The TNI's doctrine becomes the guideline for soldiers in their duties, and the code of ethics concerning concern for the surrounding community becomes the energy for soldiers wherever they are to act best. It is easier for democratic Indonesia to deploy the military as long as it is for the interests and safety of its citizens. During the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, the TNI can break through asymmetrical threats by protecting the people as the core element of the state.

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