Recognition from the view of Hegel

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Abstract---This research investigates the role and concept of “recognition” in Hegelian philosophical thought. The concept of recognition becomes important when it explains two areas of individual freedom and his relationship with others and the society in the Hegelian philosophical system. According to the Hegelian philosophy, recognition helps man go from an “abstract” me to an “attached” me. Hegel most uses the concept of recognition in family by which he defines the status of love and conflict. For Hegel, “love” creates marriages and forms the family, whereas conflict creates the natural and social situation. In its dimensional role in the individual and family, recognition should consider its interests to be those which are reflected in social institutions for alienation, as Hegel suggests it is possible for freedom and recognition to get separated. The sense Hegel conveys by recognition indicates that the “other” does not serve as one’s freedom; rather as an end rule. The main problem of this research is the way “recognition” is applied by Hegel to reconcile one’s freedom with the social essence and to provide a solution to the relationship between one’s will and the “desire” of the collective will. The research result suggests that by recognition, Hegel refers to the natural principle, then to attaching this principle to the social man to get it recognized in the other.

Keywords---Hegel, recognition, desire, love, family.

Introduction

The concept of recognition is one of the most important concepts of the Hegelian philosophical system, which constitutes a philosophical foundation for the individual's freedom and his relationship with the other and the society. In other words, this concept concerns inter subjectivity, while the other serves as a community which deals with knowledge, freedom and truth from an intersubjective point of view; a subject which is significant for understanding the concept of spirit. The concept of recognition provides a conceptual instrument to explain transition from nature to spirit. Recognitions helps Hegel to go from the “abstract” me to the “attached” me. In this sense, recognition is freedom which is achieved when it is realizing from another area. Thus, Hegel defines recognition to
be the status of love and conflict, which the former establishes marriages and families, while the latter helps form a natural and social status. Put it simply, the conflict which arises between the individual interests and those of the family, the individual and the family are recognized in the community. In conflict, the fight does not erupt between people; rather between families and ethnicities as institutions prior to the urban community. Although rooted in the Fichte’s philosophy, recognition has a different application in the Hegelian philosophy which involves such aspects as meaning of freedom, the government and the other.

For Hegel, recognition has two levels: inter-individual recognition and recognition in people and spirit of an ethnic group. For the former sense, recognition suggests that each of the individuals finds himself/herself in the other, an example of which is family and marriage. Speaking of the second level, recognition concerns the relationship between people and social institutions, wherein the relationship is one of intersubjective-based recognition relation; i.e., a relation which takes into account the individual, government and the society to reflect its own interests. Therefore, the individual or family need to avoid alienation by considering their own interests reflected in social institutions; accordingly, for Hegel, it is not possible for freedom and recognition to be isolated from each other. This sense of recognition conveyed by Hegel reveals that the other does not serve to restrict one’s freedom; rather it takes on an end rule. According to Hegel’s Theory, recognition is the practical self-interpretation process consistent with widely-agreed norms. This requires investigating various forms of historical-social life that, for Hegel, is the reincarnation of “spirit.” Concerning the philosophy of history, Hegel emphasizes recognition to deal with this end. Thus, he uses recognitions to not suppress individual’s freedom; rather to lay the ground for the protection of freedom. By recognition, Hegel seeks to reconcile the individual freedom with the social essence to provide a solution for the relation between one’s will and the collective will. The present research uses a descriptive-analytical method and gathers data from library sources to investigate the concept of “recognition” in Hegel’s philosophy.

**Theoretical basics of the research**

**Hegelian Self-Consciousness**

Self-consciousness is essentially practical insofar as it involves a desiring relation to objects, and it is essentially social insofar as that relation becomes self-consciousness only through the recognition of other subjects whose ends constrain one’s own desiring activity. Unlike Kant, Hegel considers consciousness to be completely distinct from external affairs and experiences which depend on categories, arguing that it is totally a combination of an externality. In other words, a conscious subject is not distinct and isolated from an external object; rather they are combined with and integrated into each other. A self-conscious subject does not stand against an object; rather the object and the external world are” part” of its action and under its possession which is made recognized, and vice versa. These two determine each other, considering the “other” as a product of its own action. Hegel uses consciousness and self-consciousness in two books; first in Phenomenology of Spirit, the first part of which refers to consciousness,
and second in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences which in both texts consciousness is said to be expressed following self-consciousness and reason, respectively. In these two texts, consciousness goes through three stages:

1. Sensual certainty or immediate knowledge which is implied;
2. Mediated perception or knowledge of its affairs; and
3. Understanding; knowledge of affairs under reason; knowledge of rules governing externalities

Hegel does not intend to say that an external object is potentiated by consciousness or consciousness is potentiated by an external object. Rather, he maintains that these two incorporate and potentiate and are complementary. Put it; each serves as a means for the other. Consciousness in this state is not still self-consciousness, but that is awareness of self or understanding itself. If the external object is in such a situation, self-awareness causes the consciousness to realize the difference between the self and the external object. This state creates a new form between consciousness and the object, wherein the external object is considered the older form of consciousness (Inwood, 1992:65). Hegel considers three stages for consciousness. In Phenomenology, corresponding with these three stages of consciousness, there are three main sections: first, the consciousness of the objects. In this stage, we are only conscious of the tangibles. Second, we have self-consciousness, which is expressed under social consciousness. Third, we have a reason, which combines the two previous stages (Kaplestone, 2008:183).

**Definition of Thing-In-Itself**

For Hegel, there must be an immediate thing in place if it is supposed to have an expansion, like a seed, talent and power, or what Aristotle called possibility. Of course, this possibility is not apparent; rather an actual one. Hegel defines this immediate and conflict-free thing a thing-in-itself. For Hegel, an actual possibility can be sought in the following examples: “Pigs fly” against “Tomorrow, the air rains.” Hegel argues that an actual possibility can be met in the first proposition (Knox, 71). In this sense, however, being-in-itself is not still an actuality and is merely considered to be actuality in an abstract way, because it is placed on a possibility ranking. In other words, it is more or less in a potentiality stage in this hypothesis; i.e., a potentiality which has an actual possibility. For Hegel, the thing-in-itself enjoys a plurality of potential qualities. For Hegel, a thing-in-itself is not an actuality nor real and is still regarded to be abstract. He maintains that an abstract thing cannot be real (Moadkhani, 2006:25). When it is said the thing-in-itself has no share of actuality, it is meant it is yet to transform into the realm of attachment from the abstraction, i.e., not yet determined.

**Consciousness and Thing-In-Itself**

Hegel believes that consciousness is, in the first order, entrapped with the thing-in-itself. In other words, consciousness about the thing has an uncertain character which is still entrapped in itself. One should realize, however, the thing-in-itself in the Hegelian philosophy is not as the potential thing and the two must not be confused. According to the Hegelian philosophy, the thing-in-itself stands
against necessity and inclusiveness of the concept; i.e., it is thing-in-itself in that it is delusive, as delusion of the thing-in-itself is due to its uncertainty. However, if the thing-in-itself is thought of a potential thing; as some interpreters have suggested, necessary and inclusiveness are added to the concept of the thing-in-itself. For Hegel, the thing-in-itself must be negated for its uncertainties, while the thing-in-itself is still not a concept due to uncertainty which only comes into being via my personal reference. The difference between the thing-in-itself and potential thing is important because, for Hegel, the former is not potential, with its thinking lacking a predetermined outline. Thus, the first order of consciousness is not a potential thing; rather it is the thinking itself that produces history, object and man in an active dialectic with a fight over self-consciousness. The other reason why the thing-in-itself is not the potential thing is that it may produce something wrong, which may cause demise; however, a potential thing will, necessarily and based on its own definition, converts into its own ultimate action, i.e., it finally actualizes its latent character. In sum, when it is said potentiality does not affect the thing-in-itself, the possibility of mistake in forming the history will not be negated, and determinism will, believe it or not, be completely removed from thinking. This is because determinism in words becomes necessary by the principle of the being of the potential thing in the thing, for if there is a potential thing, it is necessary to get an actual thing out of it, and this anticipation causes determinism. For Hegel, self-consciousness in phenomenology is aimed at eliminating this non-inclusiveness that lies between noumenal and phenomenal and plurality and otherness. As a result, transcendence is as much unscientific as these sensual perceptions (Hegel, 1987:88), because Kant failed to resolve the subject of noumenon. If Kant’s words are to be regarded as real, this concept is potentiated out of self-consciousness alienation; i.e., what is clear is that manifestation is not obvious and man is still alienated with the world. According to Hegel, both Being-in-itself and Being-for-other are intrinsically bound up with one another. ... Things are “in themselves” if all Being-for-other is purged. We perceive in a given thing only its Being-for-other, “the indeterminate, affirmative community of something with its other.” Hegel places thing-in-itself against thing-for-itself which is in a stage of self-consciousness. Inwood interpreted this as actual changes and uses Aristotle to express his ends and distinguishes degrees of potentiality from full actuality: a) the infant not yet learned a language is a potential speaker, and b) the individual who learns a language but does not speak is a potential speaker at a higher sense, and is an actual speaker against (a), and c) one who is an actual and perfect speaker (Inwood, 2010:258).

Elimination and Negation of Thing-In-Itself

Having defined the first stage of consciousness to be transition from the thing-in-itself, which is the pure being order, Hegel goes to the next stage of consciousness. For him, consciousness at the thing-in-itself or pure being order is an uncertain consciousness which is the demise of consciousness itself, for this kind of consciousness is constantly exposed to its demise. Also, it is distinguished by the other; i.e., it is revealed by the other. By the other in here, it is meant the way the thing is distinguished, and this consciousness is aimed at surviving this demise which has no choice other than a pure being as it consumes this partial and individual purity alone in itself. Pure being is a kind of being to which
consciousness is but a consumer, like eating seeds and drinking water by a bird. Going beyond pure being and the thing-in-itself in the certain stage of sense, the way the determination of the thing will take on a new status which ushers the way for the unity of reason and being, with the latter becoming rational. In the stage where consciousness is prone to transfer the thing into a far-away and out-of-its-domination totality, which is noumenal or reasonable forms, consciousness is alienated with itself, not taking on the concept of begriff and the thing-in-itself not becoming the thing-for-itself (2008:237). It is in the form of self-consciousness that Hegel aims to provide answers to such issues as unity and plurality, partial and totality. One should notice that consciousness is an observer of the pure being in the indefinite trend of reasoned and rational forms or what is known as noumenal. As “It is” at the stage of pure being converts to “it is not,” and “it is not” against converts to “it is,” we conclude that this turbulence and dizziness fails consciousness and disappoints the object in order to consume it like animals do; thus, all reasonable and perceived forms can, like the pure being, convert from “it is” to “it is not”.

**Self-Consciousness**

For Hegelian self-consciousness, one should focus on the fact that consciousness for Hegel is essentially a contemplative reflection or a sensual perception, suggesting that consciousness is nothing but what it perceives. Therefore, all consciousness is essentially self-consciousness. However, Hegel sometimes implies this, which concludes that he considers consciousness to be self-consciousness. This approach claims that all consciousness is a kind of self-consciousness, with the difference being that consciousness about an object does not find itself by that object like an internal object (Jenkins, 2009:114). Considering the approaches that yield self-knowledge, Hegel regards self-consciousness as a practical achievement of something as a fight for survival, something which will be nothing but an appearance mediated by self; rather a product of continuous effort. Therefore, self-consciousness is a dimension of daily perceived experience. This self-experience is not like attention to an object; rather, it will be along with all experiences. In sum, Hegel claims that consciousness is the same as the perception of the self (Habermas, 1985: 98-99). Hegel gains his reasonings about the way self-consciousness is acquired from these approaches, concluding that gaining self-consciousness cannot be met by introspection and observation. Thus, self-consciousness should always be temporary. This focus on self requires confirmation or materialization in an outside world or others. The salient example of this claim in the Hegelian Theory of Practice is that one would not conclude that the individual can solemnly swear about his intention and commitment unless he exposes it in a place where he wants to do it or make it practical (Pippin, 2008:27).

He expresses self-consciousness in relation with other people and talks about the necessity of this relationship which is essentially a social thing. However, how would this social relationship help man be conscious of his self? This definition of self-consciousness by Hegel is represented as a necessary relationship with others in three main parts. First, Hegel demonstrated the necessity of relationship with self in a simplified theoretical form and investigates it based on the simple theory that self seeks to make itself viable; for Hegel, the viability of self
represents the minimum contemplation of self-attention. However, this issue is a subject of minimum form for relating viability with self. Thus, Hegel strives to show this subject to reveal that the object of desire in preserving life is not neutral and constant, thus seeking objects which are variable and refraining from them. Here, Hegel investigates the presence of other subjects which allow for change in man’s relation with self. This was the main agenda for Hegel in phenomenology with which he resolves the problem of reason and practice (Pippin, 2008:57).

When consciousness is revealed behind the objects which regarded them to be independent of their selves, the spirit reaches the threshold of self-consciousness. Here, consciousness regards self as its own object. However, owing to the realtionship between mediation and concept in the Hegelian philosophy, consciousness can never be conscious of self in an immediate way. Pure, immediate and pseudo-mystical self-thinking does, in fact, engender in the loss of the self and the world and only leads to the delusion of self-consciousness. To describe this, one would say that consciousness is a kind of criticism of Descartes’s myth. Descartes establishes a founding myth for the dominating philosophical culture. This myth, while battling skepticism, achieves an epistemological victory.

Self-consciousness develops in three stages: 1) innate desire; 2. Recognizing self-consciousness and 3. Universal self-consciousness. Self-consciousness does not reveal itself at once and in an evident way; rather it appears in the form of desire in the first stage. This is because consciousness has found that the object is itself. Having said this, the object still remains as the external object which is regarded to be a part of the outside world and a solid thing. Consciousness, however, has found that this solid thing is, principally, itself. This situation contains inconsistency and contradiction; on the one hand, the object is the same with me, and on the other hand, it is something independent of me and is substantiated by itself. Thus, the mid functions in two way which are no consistent: 1) because the object or the subject of mind is simply the mind itself, for the work of mind is self-consciousness, and 2) because the object is still an external and independent thing; it is nor the mind itself, the work of mind is, to this limit, still consciousness. Self-consciousness needs to develop it in order to transfer from this inferior form. For Hegel, the feelings man finds to eliminate the independence of object is desire. The method self-consciousness takes to meet this end is to absorb the object in itself and to eliminate it at once. In the stage of desire, the individual, by itself, has not yet understood the other selves in the world. The object of mind were things not people. The method of the mind was one of self-loneliness; in other words, for it, nothing existed except for itself and solid things present in its surrounding, with the mind finding out that the superior was nothing but their selves. However, the mind found the other selves in the world in the new stage of self-perfection. The subject of mind is now another self or consciousness of the other. The mind sees itself not in a solid concrete thing but in another self like itself, because the other self is a manifestation of mind, and since the mind exposes itself in it, it recognizes something not recognized in the past; i.e., the presence of other selves that Hegel calls them self-consciousness of “recognition.”
Gods and Servants

To establish its status of self-consciousness, self-consciousness requires to be recognized by another self-consciousness. Thus, the key concept in the relationship between the two self-consciousness at the level of Gods and Servants is a matter of "recognition." The problem with consciousness is that as if it plays gamble, because if it establishes a relationship with another self-consciousness without being recognized by it, the other self-consciousness is no longer the recognizer of it; rather it is assumed to be a risk for it. As a consequence, this ambivalent realtionship imposes a demanding battle on the two types of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness which claimed not to be dependent on a sensual object is now beginning to understand that it is, by the way, dependent on material objects: a) on its material body, and b) on the material body of the other. However, in its battle with another self-consciousness, self-consciousness seeks to relieve itself of this kind of dependency. For this, it endangers its life by challenging its dependence on its own material body, on the one hand, and reject the other's dependence on the material body of the rival via negating and destroying the other. Hegel states that it has no choice but to enter this battle, for it has to improve its certainly towards self and the being to the concrete level of truth, and it is merely through endangering the life which results in freedom; it is only through this way that the essential being of self-consciousness reveals not a simple kind of being nor an immediate form but self-consciousness. Similarly, as one of the two self-consciousness endangers its life, it should look for another life, because it perceives itself to be more valuable than the other. The other is an immediate consciousness which is trapped in a plurality of relations and should consider its otherness as a being-for-itself or a kind of absolute negation (Hegel, 1977:114). For Hegel, this complex relationship between the two types of self-consciousness is a kind of abstract negation not originated from consciousness. In this battle, self-consciousness does not negate its own object; rather it protects it from what has been eliminated, and the object, though being eliminated, will survive (Hegel, 1977:114-115).

Hegel maintains that one of the two self-consciousness evades continuing the battle between life and death for its far of death, declaring itself loser and the other victor, in order that it lives again. As a consequence, one of these two self-consciousness, which stood up to the last stage of the battle, will be declared victor and is called Gods, whereas the other self-consciousness, announced to be the loser, will be the Servant. Initially, the relationship between Gods and Servants seems to be substantiated. The gods which are completely dependent on each other do not fear death. However, the servants depend on the gods due to their fear of death. This stage os called fear. Then, the gods misuse the far of the servants and force them to bondage. This stage is called servitude. To serve the gods and to meet their material needs, the servants manipulate the world, which is called the labor stage. These three stages could gradually cause changes to the relationship between gods and servants. History is an action in the reaction between gods and servants. Historical conflict or dialectic is one between gods and servants, as this conflict must be resolved in the end. This development first reveals the inequality between two self-conscious humans; i.e., to get their values
recognized, two humans stand against each other, with one being value-recogzer and the other value-recognized (Cozu, 1965:52). Gods are self-substantive and the inherent nature lies with this. Gods possess negative power and are absolute negators against which natural and material things are nothing. On the other hand, we come to a conclusion that the gods do the same for another as they do for themselves, and so does the servant. However, the relationship between gods and servants is not materialized in a true sense of the word. However, truth is the servant’s independent consciousness. This consciousness initially suggests it is out of itself and is not self-consciousness; however, when the servant reaches the limit of perfection, it will turn into what it is and gain true independence. A perfect human will be a free human who has eliminated his bondage through conflicts. History refers to the history of the working servant, freedom servant which finds its independence in the other; however, the lord cannot determine the value of the other one who has recognized his value. This will end up in a standstill. The servant must be relieved of servitude; however, lordship for him is the highest real value he cannot transcend it. He has become a servant to avoid endangering his life for lordship. He is ready for development and transformation. He is, in himself, a kind of transformation development. He is historical in his own essence.

Knowledge of self

Self-consciousness arises from the knowledge of self. Consciousness requires what is belonged; in this stage, when consciousness considers itself to belong to knowledge, it needs to distance itself from itself. For the individual to gain self-consciousness, he must concurrently consider himself a subject and an object of knowledge. This creates a kind of distinction inside the consciousness, and the unified consciousness converts into otherness and duality. Any relationship consciousness has with itself is imitated from its relationship with the objects. Before this, the thing belonging to consciousness was other than itself, but it is now turning towards itself. Prior to this, consciousness had unity, as it had focused on the content of what it belonged to. Now, it has realized itself, finding itself a dual thing and distancing itself. In other words, prior to realizing itself, consciousness had unity with itself, now finding in itself distinction and otherness. This is the same character known as self-consciousness.

On the other hand, the object of consciousness must be independent of self-consciousness, and on the other hand, it needs to have unity with itself to arrive at certainty. Self-consciousness is constantly moving between this independence and dependency. Therefore, to Hegel, the negation of any other kind, wither with the title of a material world and objects and other humans, arises from a knowledge problem that cannot be resolved by rejecting the other. This is because it causes many contradictions. As for the solution, Hegel believes that self-consciousness is thing-in-itself and thing-for-itself (Hegel, 1972:111).

Epistemological recognition and actuality

Actualty is a term used by philosophers and social theorists. The philosophical application of the doer is distinguished from what is recognized at social and legal organizations. The doer, entity, or organization do not embrace all the meaning
conveyed by “actuality.” In other words, they represent others, not themselves. The first “actuality” is abstract in the sense that it does not look into the materialization of its will within the path of materializing its own will; for this, it does not take on an attached thing. The second “actuality,” which is the basis for the problem of recognition and relevant issues, seeks to avoid the abstract takeaway of being a doer. One would say that the first actuality is downgraded in the concept of person. Hegel regards the concept of selfhood to be a void which requires a gap between the general and the specific (Jourest, 2016:161). In its most basic form, recognition prescribes a kind of affection and passion among the members of the society which is beyond the love constructed from the Social Contract Theory. This deeper love indicates the very sense of city-state, with the difference being that it, unlike city-state, takes into account the respect for individuality than neglects it. Using the concept of “recognition,” Hegel promises a social-political model which respects individuality and provides a basis for a collective thinking. Hegel attaches an epistemological functionality for “recognition,” arguing it is a state within the path of knowledge. Recognition has a structure like knowledge, as there is a relation between self and the object and a relationship between self and one’s essence.

Desire and self-consciousness

Here, Hegel seeks to link self-consciousness with the world through the interface of desire because for self-consciousness to be self-conscious requires the other, on the one hand, and seeks to destroy and dominate the other, on the other hand. Hegel calls this dual and conflicting relationship desire. For him, self-consciousness is the same as desire. This self-consciousness, cognizant of the nothingness of the other, affirms that nothingness is another truth for it, which destroys the independent object (Hegel, 1981:109). Desire seeks pleasure, and to substantiate itself, it negates any external intermediary which is the object of its self-consciousness; thus, taking possession of it. This dual relationship is affectionate because of the negation of a hostile object, on the one hand, and that self-consciousness needs such an object, on the other hand. This conflict in desire for self-consciousness engenders suffering and displeasure because self-consciousness abandons the object under its possession as an external object as soon as its independence is negated; thus, losing its otherness and making the process of materializing self-consciousness ineffective. Considering the process in phenomenology, consciousness will not remain in this displeasure and thus find a way out of it. Self-consciousness then looks to an object which is neither independent nor dependent, thus seeking another self-consciousness. Self-consciousness requires a battle to gain independence for its experienced object or being for the other. This self-consciousness requires another being which takes its independence for granted (Simpson, 1998:52).

For Hegel, desire serves as an experience which reveals concepts of dependence and independence for the individual. Self requires an object of desire and depends on it. To satisfy its desires, self negates its independence. By negating otherness of the object, the desire aligns with self and reaches a sense of pleasure. In the previous stages, which pertain to consciousness, the self still does not understand the implication of these concepts, because to understand the meanings of independence and dependence is to have self-consciousness and to
identify the other. However, in the stage of self-consciousness, the self goes back to itself. If consciousness is not directed at itself, the meanings of independence and dependence will not make sense. In essence, the implication of concepts of the other and concrete truth is revealed in the self-consciousness stage, because the self-consciousness experience and encountering the self and the other could best imply the truth and the other. In this stage, the self experiences objectivity and otherness it acquired in the consciousness stage. Desire constantly seeks to dominate the other and to negate it. Thus, the relationship between the individual and the world is at first a negating one. Desires is differentiated from the objects aiming to negate it. In the meantime, desires are dependent on them, because there must be something to be belonged to a desire. Desire is experienced in association with something that seeks to negate it. Thus, the desire, while negating the independence of the object, is dependent on it.

**Authentic and false recognition**

Consciousness becomes self-consciousness when it goes beyond confining itself to the abstract and steps into the realm of life. This denotes that self-consciousness becomes a conscious world. Thus, consciousness of the object will not be pure and sees it as a subject of others which takes on a ratio between two different selves; a ratio between the self and the other subject and a ratio between the self and itself. This form of “recognition” is authentic for Hegel, because any individual is for the other as the other is for him (Hegel, 1977). In this regard, Hegel defines two conditions for authentic “recognition,” the former being reciprocal and the latter equality. They identify themselves as reciprocal recognizer of each other (Hegel, 1977).

**Recognition and freedom in the family and society**

On the premise of his rationality, Hegel maintained that the natural law, which physiocrats believe in, is inadequate, because it is regarded to be an ultimacy and the end of work in the natural law of a civil society. In Hobbes’ philosophy and his seminal work “Leviathan,” absolute governance requires a guarantee and a worthwhile observer. Thus, for Hegel, the civil society cannot meet true unity and freedom due to structural constraints. For this, because independence is rejected the civil society will be a function of the self-autonomous state. By entrusting state with the task of organizing the individual in the civil society, Hegel takes independence from the civil society; though he never replaces it with the society; rather it becomes the driving force and guardian of its values. Hegel holds that it is imperative to authoritatively treat the civil society and entrust the government with organizing the individual because of the conflicting construct of the civil society. In logic, Hegel considers the reasonable form of the partial and total unity to be the realm of identification and freedom. The doer of the thinking identification lives in the history of man and the government assumes a large part of the existential conditions of the life of this doer, existing in a general interest between the actions and partial interests. People experience this general interest in various forms, with each form being a critical stage in the history of the government. Hegel argues that freedom is not the same in various eras. However, there is only one true freedom, and the government must be constructed based on this freedom, i.e., true freedom. Hegel remarks that a free man is the only man
who must, as a member of the society, adopt the covenants and agreements of the society through a moral conscience (Pelamanes, 1986:179). Hegel maintains that freedom will not be achieved in a society where its members accept its laws out of habits. Humans need to accept the legal and moral order through a moral conscience in order to gain freedom, and they can only do the same if they have reached a certain stage of intellectual and moral puberty. Accept the legal and moral order through a moral conscience is only possible in a society which can be called a self-measuring and rich society. Hegel argues that if the individual insists on his will through abstraction of any partial situation, he will possibly renounce all kinds of political and social forms and achieve something like the freedom and abstract equality praised in the Great French Revolution. By the reasonable rational form of the will, Hegel means that the will involves two fundamental characteristics between the general and the partial element, not sufficient to purge a social order. Hegel argues that one's free will must give in to the general interest. Rejecting the social contract, Hegel concludes that the contracts between individuals do not violate the realm of private rules. The contractual basis assumed for the state and society makes the whole subject to the same authority that governs private interests.

**Recognition in the family**

Hegel pointed out that a rational man whose character is self-conscious and free will achieve self-consciousness in the historical process. According to Hegel's general philosophy, family and the government are more rational than the individua, because the family and transition from it to a civil society embody stages of spirit perfection.

Governments, compared to people who make them up, are more rational and have a true embodiment of people in the course of history. Family, the civil society and government symbolize the concrete spirit, and the individual only achieves himself in the society (Boshriyeh, 1995). Having said this, Hegel believes that the most important theoretical representative of the government serves as an organized institution of rationality, and what is rational is actual, as all governments have been more or less rational. Family is a moral moment, because each and every member of it understands its prescribed role clearly. However, the family with unthought emotions and feelings cannot be a model for a broader society. This is the “recognition” that helps man consciously understand that his real interests can be guaranteed through totality. Therefore, the family is not referred to as an unthought partiality, for it actualizes in collaboration and recognition of its parts.

**Recognition in transition from the family to the civil society**

The family disintegrates as affected by the influence of the main personality and turns into a plurality of families, where the people have an embodied relationship, i.e., one of an external type. In other words, the interlinked elements need to be released from the concept and reach their reality (Hegel, 1999). One should note that Hegel considers the unity of moral mentality to be a moral essence, which lives with the moral essence in the first stage and the stage of non-intermediacy. When speaking of non-intermediacy, Hegel means that reason does exist as a
feeling because identification in the stage of non-intermediacy is embodied in the form of a feeling. This kind of moral essence appears in the first stage of socialization because we are currently in the sphere of social ethics. In other words, a moral perception has become a concrete establishment. Hegel considers this establishment based on love feeling to be family (Blackstone, 1834:129). However, what explains the role of the family in the formation of civil society is the dissolution of the old family. Children's upbringing greatly contributes to this dissolution because as children emerge, the distinguished feeling gets removed from a mental stage. Children benefit from subsistence or, as Hegel said, the subsistence of the family which the father meets. Upbringing is the prelude from potentiality to the actuality of freedom. When upbringing reaches it is ultimate, the children will achieve their freedom and independence and reserve the right to have property for themselves and get married to find a new family. One would say that the new family is the product of civil society because when a civil society appears, the type of families that emerge from within society will be replaced with other types, which is closer to the truth to say that this type of family has come out from the heart of civil society, not vice versa. Having said this, the civil society of this kind of family seems to be greater in terms of time; that is, this type of small family is the product of the formation of civil society rather than the creator of civil society. With his true understanding of the new society and its characteristics, i.e., being threatened with fragmentation, Hegel argued that the individual sphere, compared to the general sphere, i.e., the moral state, allows the freed individual to be exclusively directed by his own will and to be relieved from all forms of constraints and bondage. To Hegel, civil society is the embodied individual or a set of needs and a blend of necessity and arbitrariness, which is his ultimate goal; this is one of the principles of civil society. However, the specific end takes on a totality form concerning others and is satisfied as others achieve welfare. All society is a realm of intermediacy where all individual characteristics, as well as all talents and events, are released, and it is a place where all waves of bitterness glare.

Conclusion

The concept of recognition constitutes one of the most significant concepts in Hegel's philosophical system. By raising this concept, Hegel seeks to offer a philosophical premise for the evolutionary history of the concept of freedom, while trying to provide a conceptual means to explain the problem of the transition from nature to culture. The definition of spirit in the book "The Phenomenology of Spirit" substantiates this claim: Spirit for Hegel is essentially a collective, an intersubjective phenomenon that is established or, we would say, instituted as a result of its own development towards freedom. But Hegel understands spirit both at individual (as "mind") and intersubjective levels (as "objective spirit"). According to the Hegelian philosophy, recognition helps man go from the "abstract" me to an "attached" me. Hegel most uses the concept of recognition in family by which he defines the status of love and conflict. For Hegel, "love" creates marriages and forms the family, whereas conflict creates the natural and social situation. In its dimensional role in the individual and family, recognition should consider its interests as those which are reflected in social institutions in order to alienation, as Hegel suggests it is possible for freedom and recognition to get separated. The sense Hegel conveys by recognition indicates that the "other" does not serve as
one's freedom; rather as an end rule. To Hegel, society not only does not suppress freedom, but also lays the ground for its protection. Thus, Hegel aims to reconciles individual freedom with the social essence and provides a solution to the problem of the importance of the relationship between the individual will and collective will.

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