Explicating Martin Heidegger's "Dasein" as being-in-the-world

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Abstract---In a bid to carry out the philosophical analysis of man, Heidegger employed the term "dasein" which is in line with his characteristic philosophical system. Meanwhile, Heidegger invented various terminologies in his existential analysis of human existence. The human existence posited for him two possible modes of existence: authentic and inauthentic modes of existence. In authentic existence, man fully attained consciousness of the self which leads to self-realization and eventual self-actualization and fulfillment. On the contrary, inauthentic existence cripples an individual person within the ambiance of "they" and the individual's ownmost potentiality-for-being remains in the "they". Nevertheless, Heidegger postulates that although man is thrown into the world with all its facticity and limitations, yet he has all the possibilities of attaining an authentic existence or decides to remain in inauthenticity of existence. The writer primarily focuses on the methodological approach of philosophical appraisal as a necessary measure to perfect objective of the study. The researcher finally comes to a conclusion that man is a being in the world in the midst of unavoidable limitations and facticity. Nevertheless, this man who is in the world is imbued with all the capabilities and capacity to overcome or surmount his shortcomings and hindrances and yet retaining his authenticity and achieving his self-actualization. Unless this is achieved, man will surely remain in his inauthenticity and his self un-realized and un-actualized.

Keywords---Being-with-others, Being-as-care, Existentiality, Facticity, Fallenness.

1. General Introduction

In other to understand clearly the Heideggerian notion of our theme of discussion in this work, it is pertinently important to give an analytic exposition of "dasein"
since Heidegger's construction of ontology starts with and revolves around the term. This will in no small measure facilitate better understanding of the discourse. Hence:

If we wish to examine exhaustively one particular form it is best to begin, not with the world which cannot give us direct answer, but with the only form which willingly tends to itself,... the being which is ourselves (Grimsley; 1960).

The issue, however, involves questioning human existence with a view to describing its major characteristics. This, therefore, includes the ontological analysis of human reality as well as "dasein's" possible modes of existence in the world which he lives in reality. Then, of course, the ontological analysis of "dasein" makes up a major part of Heidegger's work: "Being and Time" (Sein und Zeit) which he published in 1927 (Hodgson; 2016). With phenomenological method and self innovated terminologies, Heidegger advanced to make distinction between "ontic" and "ontological", between particular "being" or what Grimsley would call "crude existence" and "Being". The "ontic" objects designate particular "being" (Seinde) or ordinary entities which are encountered in the world. But there is more fundamental "Being" (Sein) of these entities in the region of ontological phenomenon. Such being assumes the structure of intelligibility and meaning. This kind of "Being" in traditional philosophy has been used in different perspectives. As far back as St. Thomas Aquinas, the "Being" signifies:

... an act as such, the most real of all realities, the actuality of all actualities and most perfect of all perfections (Aquinas; 1989).

It is often used as a signification of existence of God as the "supreme Being". But in the phenomenological ontology of Heidegger, "Sein" is the basis of all that exist. It is the primordial substance of all existence. In existential analysis of Dasein we analyse human reality at the level of its ontological structure as opposed to a simple description of it in various fields of thought. The term "dasein", therefore, derives from two German words: "da" meaning, "a place", "there", and "sein" meaning "Being" or "to be". As such, "dasein" literally means "Being-there". Heidegger used the word to designate existence especially that of man, even though the word is not equivalent to man. Nevertheless, the term, "dasein", is regarded as the closest word that would enhance the understanding of the analysis. Heidegger himself prefers to use the word "dasein" to connotes man for some reasons. Thus:

Dasein accordingly takes priority over all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an Ontical One: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determination character of existence. The second priority is an Ontological One: Dasein is in itself ontological because existence is thus determinative for it. Dasein has a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological possibility of any analysis (Heidegger; 1962).

In other words, "dasein" stands out and differentiates itself from other beings (seinde) which are, but do not exist. In all appearances "dasein" alone exists. In addition, therefore,
Dasein has no quality, it is this concrete way of existing and nothing else. Thus we cannot speak of Dasein as substance which remains unchanged while the rest of the self is committed to some kind of modification (Grimsley; 1960).

With this Grimsley explains the second reason why Heidegger chose to use man to designate "dasein". Besides, "dasein" is constituted by changeable possibilities of its existence. Likewise, to facilitate the understanding of our discourse, both words are to be used interchangeably in the proceeding expositions.

2. "Dasein" As Being-In-The-World

Being in the world is one of the constituent elements of "dasein". It is a Phenomenological and ontological assertion which affirms that man by virtue of his existence is stood out in the world. Hence,

This state of being does not arise just because of some other entity is present at-hand outside the Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can meet up with Dasein only in so far as it can of its own accord show itself within the world (Heidegger; 1962).

Thus to Dasein, "Being-in" is something that belongs essentially. Being-in designates to dwell, to reside and to dwell alongside. We also need to distinguish between the "world" as it is used by Heidegger and the ordinary conception of it. Heidegger's conception of the world is rather ontological. Ontologically, therefore, 'world' is not a way of characterising those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein (Roger; 2021). Conspicuously, Heidegger rejected the ontical manner of narrowing the world to the things of nature. Magda testified to this regard as he observes:

Those ontic conception of the world, namely, natural universe, the all of beings are decisively rejected by Heidegger so much that when he uses the term 'world' in any of those senses, he always underlines or writes it in quotation marks (Magda; 1965).

Such conceptions of the world, for Heidegger, would give us the world which has been understood and has meaning without man who understands it himself. Contrary to this, Heidegger holds that the world is ontological a priori of the being of man whereby he is able to exists factually. Thus

If man is fastened to the world, then the world is also fastened to man, so that it is impossible to speak of a world-without-man (Luipjen; 1985).

Therefore, Dasein is a being-in-the-world and will ever remain in the world in so far as it factually exists. It is unthinkable to have man living outside the spatio-temporal world. Consequently, Being-in-world (in-der-welt) is a "conditio sine quanon" for man's existence. Both man and the world are intermingling and interdependent. In such condition, therefore, man finds himself in the world without his choosing or applying for. He is proned to live according to the demand of the 'public world' and his closest environment. Placed under such a situation
"dasein" struggles to orientate itself and leads a life open to the call of its beinglessness.

3. Being- with - Others

This is another basic existential characteristic of "dasein". Ordinarily, we do not find ourselves alone in the world but surrounded by other people. Man is not self-sufficient in his every day needs. He is essentially other related or social. As far back as Socrates, man was viewed as a "political animal" (zoo politikon). Aristotle reiterated the need for man's co-existence.

He who is unable to live in society or who has no need because he is self-sufficient is either a beast or a god (McKeon; 1941).

As such no single individual can claim to be self-sufficient. To do so is to live a presumptuous and inhuman life. Besides, Buber maintained that no person can live on his own without the other individuals in the world. For him,

There is no 'I' taken in itself but only the 'I' of the primary word 'I-Thou ' and the 'I ' of the primary word 'I-it ' (Buber; 1954).

In Heidegger, "dasein" existence is essentially grounded in the "being-with-others" (Mit sein). According to him, therefore, as long as man is in the world, he encounters these "others" and in the same world. Hence, there is a relationship between "dasein's" being-in-the world and its being-with-others (Christos; 2019)

Being in is being-with-others.... Being with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factually no other is present.... The other can be missing only in and for a being with (Arendt; 1958).

In accordance with this Arendt observes that;

No human being, not even the hermit in the natures wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testified to the presence of other human beings (Heidegger; 1962).

Nevertheless, "dasein's" being-with-others is not merely a question of being with things "ready-to-hand". By things-ready-to-hand, Heidegger means those other entities which we encounter in the world. In dressing on "dasein's" being-with-others we do not point to anyone else, but those "others" with whom "dasein " is at home in the world. They are those from whom one does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is too. Because of man's being-in-the-world with other people he has solicitude. This solicitude for Heidegger is man’s care for his fellow men through his interaction with them in his day-to-day existence. Such solicitude has two manifestations: that which "leaps in" and dominates and that which "leaps ahead" and liberates. When solicitude "leaps in" for other, it takes over that which should be a concern to the other. In such solicitude, therefore,

The other is then thrown out of his own position.... In such a solicitude, the other becomes one who is dominated and dependent even if this domination is tacit and remains hidden from him (Heidegger; 1962).
In other words, the other is not free to assume its own "dasein" whose essence is care. On the other hand, when solicitude "leaps ahead" for the other, it restores his care. Here solicitude "leaps ahead" for the other, ...not in other to take away the scale but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time (Heidegger; 1962).

Here the other becomes unique and remains undominated. In this possible mood of "dasein" as regards its being-with-others "dasein" is subjected to the power of the other. In the solicitude as "leaps in" "dasein" becomes inauthentic (das man) since he is objectified. But in the solicitude as "leaps ahead" it is authentic as far as he is recognised as a fellow human being in the world and sustains himself in the manner of existence.

4. Being - as - Care

Heidegger applied the term "Care" to demonstrate three basic constitutions of man's existence as being. The being of "dasein" in the world reveals itself as care. Care as used here is not in the same sense as having regard for something as somebody neither does it mean being disposed. Instead, it designates the internally unified structure of the human person. As an existential ontological structure of man, therefore, care designates a mode of man's existence in the world. But man as in the world is dwelling with things which he takes into care. However, Molina points out that,

The term 'care' ... is used in a pure ontologico-existential manner. From this signification every tendency of Being which one might have in mind ontologically, such as worry (Barsoginis) or carefree- ness (sorglosigkeit) is ruled out (Molina; 1969).

Care as the totality of the mode of man's existence in the world comprises three aspects, namely: Existentiality, Facticity and Fallenness.

4.1. Existentiality

This is one among the three inseparable characteristics of human being. The term is a derivative of "Existence" and is one of the most constitutive structures of "Dasein". It is used exclusively as particular to man; for only man characterized by this kind of relation. By existence, man distinguishes himself from the other items or objects in the world and is open to himself and open to the world. Hence, the term Existence (existenz) refers to the type of Being which is particular to Dasein. The Being (Sein) itself to which Dasein can relate itself in some way we call existence (Heidegger; 1962).

Existentiality, however, is characteristically a being of possibility (Emoglichung). As regards this, therefore, Greece opines that:

Man is possibility, he has the power to be. His existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are open to him and since this choice is never final,
once and for all, his existence is underdeterminate but not terminated (Greece; 1957).

In such underdetermined existence "dasein" discloses in itself the existential structure of projection. In projection "dasein" sees itself as "in" and "of" and "with" the world. It moves toward, beyond and ahead of itself. It also moves toward itself since such movement constitutes its very essence, "Dasein" constantly direct itself upon future and moves outside itself, from what is to what is not yet. As regards this, Akam notes that:

Projecting sees the world as existing for Dasein's sake. It gives man the future characteristic of moving towards his possibilities, of actually becoming. Hence, it is understanding and projecting that Dasein can call itself back to the self (Akam; 1989).

This notion of possibility can take "authentic" or "inauthentic" form depending on the "dasein's" mode of existence.

4.2. Facticity
As we saw already, "dasein" has been cast (geworfen) into the world without being consulted. It is faced with some challenging "burdens" which placed limitations over its being or existence. According to Macquarie,

Facticity denotes all those elements in human existence that are simply given not chosen (Macquarie; 1986).

In other words, facticity has a significance of throwness. It comprises those pre-determined "givens" of man such as his sex, nationality, cultural background, et cetera. Amidst these limitations "dasein" has no option other than appropriate and assimilate freely within the inescapable limits. Consequently, man is left with the task of transcending his situation and in attempt to do so facticity imposes some limitations and places an ontological limitation to "dasein's" projection and factually binds his possibility.

4.3. Fallenness
So far as we have seen that "dasein" in the world is not alone but with his "co-daseins" and other entities. He is influenced by them in his every day activity. However, he tries to accomplish his human vocation and thus authenticate his existence amidst his inescapable relation with them. In such a situation the "dasein" has the tendency to occupy itself unduly with the others. It stands a chance of losing itself in a crowd - an unthinking collectivity. Hence, Heidegger defines Fallenness as, an absorption in Being-with-one-another (Heidegger; 1962). Mmadudiri & Onwuatuegwu note that,

Fallenness constitutes the ontological quest for knowing one's Being, realizing one's being, which essentially belongs to Dasein as being-in-the-world (Mmadudiri &Onwuatuegwu; 2020).

However, the "absorption in" has the character of Being-lost in the "publicness" of the "they". Here, the forward driving and the unique individual existence is
substituted by the persistent and pressing "they". "Dasein" gets lost in the "idle talk" of the "they", thereby lowering itself to the level of "Das man" - the anonymous individual and have itself snatched from it. If this is not properly checked, "dasein" is bound to be characterized by inauthenticity. With this Heidegger proposed two basic modes of human existence, namely: "authenticity" and "inauthenticity" (Schmid & Thonhauser; 2017). The proceeding exposition of basic structures of "dasein " has been made to assist in proper comprehension of these basic modes of existence and their attainability. We now move into explicating what Heidegger really means by authentic and inauthentic existence.

5. Inauthenticity and Authenticity

In the foregone discourse, we have attempted analytical explication of human existence. One can be led to discover that "dasein" constantly projects itself toward its utmost potentiality for being. As a being with others in the world, it is placed in between two possible modes of existence. For Heidegger, the distinction between the two can be derived from the existence of one as a necessary part of man’s being or existence. Both are based on "dasein 's" existence as a concrete personal possibility. The attitude of "dasein " towards its potentiality for being, therefore, determines the quality and mode of its existence.

5.1. Inauthenticity

This is a mode of living whereby the individual is led to forget what it means "to be". The self of "everydayness" of "dasein " is the "they-self". In such state of existence, "dasein " has fallen "victim" to the "dictatorship" of no particular person. Its personal identity is seen in peaceful and trusted world of impersonal and anonymous "they" (Das man). This fallen state of "dasein " is typical of one who is leading inauthentic - or non-genuine life. Mary Warnock, hence, remarks:

Such a man ignores the reality of his own existence with the world. There is ambiguity in his dealing with reality. He partly knows what things are, but partly does not, because he is entirely cut up in the way other people see them.... The inauthentic man accepts the significance which everyone else attaches to things (Warnock; 1970).

According to Heidegger himself, in the state of inauthenticity, the others exercise an express control and dictatorship, though no one can claim the dictatorship. Here, the "dasein " is devoid of its "answerability" because "they" is always the one who did it. Thus,

Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of the 'others', in such a way indeed, that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the they is unfolded (Heidegger; 1962).

In fact, what remains in this state of being is the self. But even the self-hood constitutes the inauthentic, non-genuine man. And for "dasein " to stand by the self, there is much need for:
a clearing away of concealments, obscurities ... a breaking up of the disguises with which dasein bars its own way (Heidegger; 1962).

With this "dasein " would definitely return to itself out of the dispersion of "Das man ".

5.2. Authenticity

Authenticity implies realising one's position in his everyday being with others in the world. And this self-realization is characterised by the fact that each individual is uniquely himself, and that each has his own potential possibility to fulfil. Macquarie, hence, maintains that,

Existence is authentic to the extent that the existent has taken possession of himself and shall we say, has moulded himself in his own image (Macquarie; 1973).

Even at that Heidegger still insists that,

Authentic Being - one's- self does not rest upon an exceptional condition that has been detached from the they; it has rather an existential modification of the they .... as an essential existentiale (Heidegger; 1962).

As such, authenticity in Heidegger does not overlook the fact that "dasein " relates with its "co-daseins" and other existents. Rather it is calling for constant disclosedness for living authentically to the extent that "dasein" relates itself to things around it. With this "dasein" becomes conscious of the fact that it is "being-with-others" and thus possessing an exclusive ontological relation with them. Such disclosedness, however, should not be construed in terms of contiguity, causality or coincidence, but as a special irreducible kind of relation. Thus one lives authentically when one accepts one's existential possibility and lives it to the full. When we grasp this;

our concern with the world instead of being a mere concern to do as people in general do, to do things necessarily for living as other members of our society live, can become authentic concern, to fulfill our real potentiality in the world (Warnock; 1970).

In authenticity, therefore, one grasps one's own uniqueness, the concept of inwardness and subjectivity.

6. Evaluation and Conclusion

6.1. Evaluation

Heidegger has really undertaken a great and wondrous work towards the intellectual upliftment of man. He, therefore, has provided us with original Anthropology of man. It is to the credit of Heidegger that he has elevated man over and above other existents and as well recognised him as being above other existents. Consequently, with the dawn of Heideggerian philosophy, human existence is reinterpreted anew. Stumpf says of him thus:
From his flesh interpretation of the concept of Being, Heidegger produced a new conception and understanding of man (Stumpf; 1983).

In his notion, therefore, man is the only self conscious being and can raise the question of his beingness. Invariably, Heidegger must be reckoned as the philosopher of our time who has successfully worked out complete and systematic analysis of human existence. Nevertheless, of course, Heidegger's postulation of death as a porter which ushers us into the abyss of "nothingness" constitutes an avenue for injurious criticism to his work. His doctrine of death has no idea of eternity. If we are to subscribe to such doctrine, it would seem or suggest that his doctrine of authenticity or self-realization has been invalidated or delineated as non sequitur. Finally, it must be pointed out that even in the midst of some flaws in Heideggerian treatise, we still have every cause to be grateful to him for his immense contribution. Aristotle clearly and unequivocally said of him thus:

We do well therefore, to give heed, not only to those whose opinion agree with our own but also to those whose statements seem trivial; for they too, have contributed something by giving us a realization (Aristotle; 1961).

Obviously, Heidegger has contributed in no small measure to philosophical advancement in contemporary era. Of all his contemporaries, his existential analysis survives up to the trend of the present time.

6.2. Conclusion

After all that have been said, a very pertinent and fundamental question still looms: can we find concrete realization of man which is fully in possession of his own true image? Or, what are the criteria for authentic living? For Heidegger, this should be possible through personal and relentless effort to follow the recipes of anxiety, death and conscience. Each of them plays a very prominent role in attestation of authenticity.

7. Acknowledgement

May I quickly thank God, the source and summit of all human existence for his never failing grace which has enabled me to make this work a reality. His Holy Name will ever remain blessed both now and forever more, amen. A tree they say does not make a forest, just as no one has monopoly of knowledge. I, therefore, humbly acknowledge and appreciate very respectfully the indept insight late Rev. Fr. Charles C. Okeke has given to this work. May he continue to rest perfectly and peacefully in the bosom of God, amen. I equally thank in a special way Rev. Fr. Paul Denis Okoli for his wonderful encouragement and inspiration, as well as his indept intellectual insightful contribution.

8. References