The Contribution of Levinas’ Conception of Responsibility to Ethical Encounter Counselor-Counselee

Zummy Anselmus Dami a, Imanuela Pandu b, Elka Anakotta c, Agustinus Sahureka d

Correspondence Author a

Abstract

In fact, humans have always been closely related to others. This relationship can be meant to encounter ethical counselor-counselee which is based on an attitude of responsibility. The concept of Levinas’s responsibility can be laid at the foundation for the ethical relationship of counselor-counselee to contribute and strengthen the concept of responsibility in the literature of guidance and counseling, as well as in counseling practices. Based on the literature review and critical analysis, we found the following results: 1) The helping profession is to be interpreted in the framework of thinking responsibility, and the responsibility of counselor-counselee should be able to be realized in concrete actions and patterned being-for so that it becomes I-for-You (asymmetrical), should not be reversed into a being-with so that it becomes You-to-I (reciprocity/mutuality); 2) Responsibility in the context of multicultural counseling is seen in phenomenological by pointing at reality in awareness counselor (intentionality); 3) Empathy as a major component of the counselor in the basic attitude of its existence takes responsibility for substitution (one-in-the-place-of-another). The responsibility of substitution is the unique and the total responsibility of the counselor-counselee; and 4) Reconciliation as the main goal of responsibility.

Keywords

counselee; counselor; encounter; framework; responsibility;

Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 71
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 72
2. Materials and Methods ...................................................................................................................... 73
   2.1 Biography of Levinas .................................................................................................................... 73

a Universitas Persatuan Guru 1945 NTT, Indonesia
b Politeknik Negeri Ambon, Indonesia
c The Christian State Institute of Ambon, Indonesia
d STT Maluku, Indonesia

71
1. Introduction

The counselor in carrying out the profession of assistance has professional competence in the field of guidance and counseling. The main role of the counselor is to organize counseling in various aspects, including individual counseling, group counseling, family counseling, career counseling, education counseling, and also conducting various aspects of the consultation, whether by parents and evaluate the implementation of guidance and counseling. The provision of guidance and counseling services is always tied to interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships (Wibowo, 2017). Understanding of this relationship is important and meaningful because the profession of the counselor is a profession that does not experience stagnation, pleasing and related to the problems faced by humans (Kushendar et al., 2018; Sapardi et al., 2018; Dewi & Dwiyanti, 2018).

The profession of a counselor as a dynamic profession must follow the pattern of client development, and not make the profession of assistance to be a free-value profession and release the control but become a profession that emphasizes the values and ethics of professional. The helping profession that does not understand and promote the values, ethics and legal responsibilities of counselors and clients can cause harm to themselves (Gladding, 2012). In contrast, the helping profession that puts forward values, ethics and responsibilities can make life counselor and client be happy (Prayitno & Amti, 2004), has the welfare of life (Van-Petegem et al., 2007). This is the main responsibility of the counselor, which is respect for the dignity and furthering the welfare of the counselee (ACA Code of Ethics, 2014; Aryani, 2018).

The concept of responsibility is always directed at the quality of counselors, and success in counseling is more dependent on personal qualities than using certain techniques correctly (Tyler, 1969). With regards to the quality of counselor, there are three basic things that need to be discussed regarding the personal qualities of a counselor, namely: knowledge, skill, and personality. Among the three mentioned, the quality of personality is the most important thing, although others are also not less important, and the three are a unity that cannot be separated from each other. Personality as the most important thing compared to knowledge and skill has been proved by some previous research results, including Truax & Charkhuff, Waren, Virginia & Satir said that effective counselor is a counselor who has personal qualities. The quality of a personal counselor have a higher value of counseling techniques because the personality of a good counselor can be understood like, counselor understands the intent and purpose of counseling done, counselor knows himself, know counselee, and mastered the process of counseling (Putri, 2016).

In the personality aspects of the counselor, the pearl of responsibility is found. Responsibility is one of the personality characterizers of counselor (Willis, 2007 in Putri, 2016), and therefore school counselors need to continue to receive training related to their ethical responsibilities (ASCA, 2016). A lot of guidance and counseling literature discusses the responsibilities of counselors towards learners (counselee), teachers, parents of students, and principals. In substance, the concept of responsibility written in the literature of guidance and counseling is still visible brittle because it has not touched the depth of the true meaning of the essence of the responsibility itself. The literature of guidance and counseling only lays out the responsibility "in the matter", but does not explain the substance and the nature of the responsibility of the "what is like". On the basis of this argument, the concept of responsibility is sometimes misinterpreted by a counselor because
there is a tendency for a counselor to use the presence of counselee to meet all their own needs. Or in other words, the attitude of responsibility committed by the counselor is no longer a value but conditioning. The main encouragement, motivation, and inspiration of counselor in counseling are to fulfill their needs, or anything else such as supervision demands, accreditation interests, teacher certification, feelings of embarrassment towards teacher, just fulfillment of counseling hours, and even for the reward. The perspective of such counselor’s responsibility will make counselee as an object, or objectivate counselee in counseling practice with the main motivation is fulfillment of the needs of counselor.

It can be associated with what is meant as the morality of selfism or culture of selfism – a culture that emphasizes excessively on oneself and self-attention. Someone will find himself to be better at the time of thinking about oneself (Brooks, 2019). This is the pattern of behavior and thought the "haunting" counselor in the era of "My Generation" (Me Generation). "My generation" counselors are no longer think others as others (the other), but rather others just as objects. In this context, Levinas destroys the concept of such responsibility. According to Levinas the concept of responsibility is asymmetric, rather than reciprocating or mutuality, concrete, precede the knowledge and freedom of man, substitution, unique, total and based on self-awareness (intentionality). On the other, the concept of Levinas’ responsibilities contributes and strengthens the concept of responsibilities written in the literature of guidance and counseling.

Based on the background, the focus of this writing is discussing the contribution of the concept of Levinas’ responsibilities to the role of the counselor in providing assistance to the counselee, namely personal service, career, social, and learning. In this article, the authors will discuss, first, introduction; second, the biography of Levinas; third, the essence of Levinas’ responsibilities; fourth, Levinas’ responsibilities characteristics; fifth, responsibility: an ethical encounter of counselor-counselee; and sixth, the conclusion.

2. Materials and Methods

This is qualitative research with a literature review approach where data is gathered from library sources relating to subject matter such as books and journals. Based on the data obtained, the data is then analyzed and the interpretation is related to the contribution of the concept of Levinas’ responsibilities to the ethical encounter counselor-counselee.

2.1 Biography of Levinas

Emmanuel Levinas was born in the 20th century as a French-Lithuanian philosopher. Levinas was born in 1906 to Jewish parents in Kaunas, Lithuania. Being a Jewish Lithuanian, he was confronted with a Christian environment. Levinas lived as a Christian who was not free of tendencies and anti-Semitic actions, and with Russian language and culture that dominated the school system at that time. Levinas studied the Bible and learned to read in Hebrew, and also learned from famous Russian poets and the authors of the romance stories Pushkin, Gogol, Lermontov, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy. Levinas learns everything in the original language and establishes his thought. In 1923, Levinas left Russia and went to Strasbourg to study philosophy. Levinas found freedom of politic and philosophical traditions in France and made him love France. In 1930, Levinas completed his dissertation and became a French citizen. In his studies, he studied classical Greek texts, psychology, and philosophical traditions (Peperzak, 1993).

Before World War II in 1939, at the beginning of World War II, he had to enter the French army. A year later (1940) was a prisoner of war in Germany. Meanwhile, all his family in Lithuania was murdered because they were Jewish (Bertens, 1985). In 1947, Levinas was appointed as director of the Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale in France. Through the university, Levinas had two academic activities: Levinas taught French for teachers in schools located in the Mediterranean area, and Levinas also provided teaching materials for the collection of Jewish scholars in France by conducting the Talmud interpretation. In 1957, Levinas contributed to the Talmud annual meeting of Jewish intellectuals in France (Hand, 1989; Sobon, 2018).

In his academic career, Levinas was appointed Professor 2 times, in 1961 as a professor at Poitiers and in 1967 became a Professor at the University of Paris X at Nanterre. In 1973, he was appointed professor at the Sorbonne, where he completed his undergraduate studies until his doctorate, until his retirement (1976), and died on 25 December 1995 (Peperzak, 1993; Doren, 2018).
2.2 Levinas’ Ideas of Responsibility

Before describing the nature and concept of Levinas’ responsibilities further, we need to first understand the five important ideas that Levinas often used in relation to the concept of responsibility, namely the other (Autrui/Autre), the face (le Visage), infinity, proximity, and exteriority. First, "the other" means the person who we are going to embrace completely, the person who we will imagine as an object, and the person we can understand his alterity. This is the central point of Levinas to sue the philosophical traditions of its history to tend to absolute the ego. From Plato to Heidegger, philosophy has been a totalization project. "The other" is always beyond the intelligibility of the ego. "The other" is something exterior, transcendent, "the infinite", which transcends consciousness and the world of ego. "The other" is not an alter ego, to me, it is not "I the other", the ego that opens itself in other form. "The other", like "the other", writes Levinas, "not just an alter-ego. It is something that is not me" (Levinas, IT, 1969; Derrida, 1978). Second, for Levinas, "the face" is not a physical form of daily. It transcends all ontological categories. "The face", according to Levinas, "present in his refusal to be embraced" (Levinas, TI, 1969). This "the face" was the marker of "the other", who sued me, to come out of my subjectivity, to accost me, and to meet him ethically. The appearance of "the face" is, "the way in which "the other" shows himself, transcends the idea of another in me" (Levinas, IT, 1969). "The face" is "a signification without context" (Levinas, EIC, 1982). In other words, the face is a way in which "the other" shows himself in front of me that transcends my capacity to measure, understand, and theming him. Third, "The infinite" is something that can not be fully understood because "the other" differs from the "I", ego, or consciousness. "The infinite" appears and cracking the wholeness of the ego. His appearance, according to Levinas, knocked the ego out of his self and consciousness. Here Levinas gave the important weight to "the infinite" concept that he had introduced, and emphasized that "the infinite" almost always means "the other" (Autru, L'autre). Thus, "the infinite" is always tangible in "the other" and the experience of meeting him. Fourth, "the proximity" of the other, my approach to you, precedes all the feelings or experiences that come from and return to the ego. "The proximity" between yourself and "the other" directly marks the ethical demands to submit in front of "the other", "the infinite", in its differences that cannot be embraced completely. "The proximity" is a demand because it has a characteristic of non-relational, passive, direct (immediate), and non-mediate. There is no complete totality between me and you; me and the infinite. Fifth, "the exteriority" is a condition when the appearance of "the other" cannot be fully mastered in my own being. "The exteriority" means a state where "the other" "is outside" myself, and makes me understand my limitations and my presence as "the infinite". It is out there, naked, shivering, and calling out my consciousness to meet him (Levinas, IT, 1969; Bachelard, 1964).

2.3 The Essence of Levinas’ Responsibility

Levinas brings the concept of philosophy from abstract ideas to concrete experience in relation to the need and requirements of "the other". When I met with "the other", I was not able to free myself from this ethical relationship. I must have a responsibility towards others on the level of basic needs as the primary. In the act of confronting others, I could not conceal myself from others. I cannot enjoy my life in myself because the act of confronting here is an openness to others without demanding a reply to oneself. This concrete situation moves from me to have a responsibility to others. For a clearer picture, the concept of Levinas’ responsibilities will be discussed as such:

First, responsibility precedes knowledge. Responsibility, for Levinas, is not conditioned by knowledge. In fact, responsibility occurs when we meet other people’s faces. This ethical relationship precedes the knowledge of others. Or in other sense, I have a responsibility to others even though I do not know him. As Levinas states that I understand responsibility as responsibility for "the other", thus responsibility for what is not my deeds, or for that which is not the problem of me, or perhaps the problem to me, be found through me as “a face”. (Levinas, El, 1985). I am in front of the other is an infinite responsibility (Levinas, TTO, 1986), a responsibility that does not start from a commitment and decision, without principle and origin, because that responsibility is beyond knowledge (Levinas, EE, 1978). For Levinas dealing with others, I have no choice, I must have a responsibility towards others. Running away from responsibility, for Levinas is not possible. Levinas gives an example of unavoidable responsibility, the responsibility of preceding knowledge, and the responsibility of being beyond knowledge through the biblical story of Jonah. Jonah could not flee from God’s
will, and God commanded him to go to Nineveh to warn the people there about the judgment of the Lord for their sins. But for Jonah, the people of Nineveh were considered others and not his attention. Jonah wanted to reject God’s commandment. In accordance with Levinas, we cannot escape the responsibility as Jonah could not have escaped responsibility to others. Jonah could not deny his responsibility to the people of Nineveh even though Jonah wanted to flee this responsibility because he did not know the people of Nineveh. (Levinas, TT2, 1978).

Second, responsibility precedes freedom. Levinas declares the fact that freedom is not the first because it is self-responsible before freedom. Freedom here can be thought of as a possibility of doing what one cannot do in my place; Freedom is the uniqueness of responsibility (Levinas, GT, 2000). For Levinas, the responsibility of others precedes my freedom. Therefore, freedom is not the essence of subjectivity. Freedom does not mean that I am free to do according to my will as there is the autonomous, but the responsibility of others comes to me and asks before I use the freedom I have. In the interview with Richard Kearney, Levinas said that for me, the freedom of the subject is not the highest or the most major. Heteronomy from our response to another human or God as “the other” and the absolute most, precedes the autonomy of the freedom of our subjectivity. Soon I knew I was responsible, I accepted that my freedom was preceded by an obligation to others. Ethics redefines subjectivity as a heteronomous responsibility in opposition to freedom of autonomous. Although I deny my primordial responsibilities to others by declaring my freedom as a primary, I never escape the fact that others have demanded a response from me before I declare my freedom not to respond to the demands of others. Thus, it can be concluded that the ethics of freedom is heteronomous freedom that is required to help others (Kearney, 1984). My heteronomous responsibility for others is absolute, where the struggles and troubles of others become my burden, the responsibility of others to be my responsibility, and that responsibility takes place beyond my freedom (Magnis-Suseno, 2006).

Third, non-normative responsibilities. In this aspect, Levinas does not make certain policies or rules as a basis for responsibility. In this aspect, Levinas does not affirm normatively. It is not normative in the sense that Levinas does not declare: we must pay attention to others, obliged to respect others, obliged and willing to be responsible for others. Levinas does not give a rule that a person should perform, because Levinas posits phenomenally by referring to a reality that exists in human consciousness. Levinas also explains that meeting others, one has always been in the responsibility of others, and all the behaviors that a person does is based on that responsibility (Magnis-Suseno, 2000).

Fourth, substitution responsibilities. For Levinas responsibility to others is the responsibility of the substitution. The substitution can be expressed appropriately with the phrase "a person is in the place of another person" (Levinas, OB, 1981). In this context, the subject has such a maintainer role for others such as skin function nurturing the entire body against external hazards. It also informs about the ethics of motherhood (Levinas, OB, 1981). Thus, fundamentally all the actions of a person in the substitution do not begin and terminate within a person but depart from the other person without demanding or request a response to myself. The substitution of others implies the meaning of a person ignoring himself for the sake of others-beyond his pride because reconciliation with others is the beginning of all his efforts (Levinas, OB, 1991). The substitution is closely related to uniqueness. The uniqueness of a person is the uniqueness of what is and can not be replaced. One’s responsibility to others also pertains to others as others, and others are unique. The uniqueness of others cannot be reduced to the same type. This is the unique ethical relationship of a person to the uniqueness of others. Unique means not only in relationships with it, but others become the only meaningful and meaningful at the time. The essence of responsibility is on the uniqueness of the person to which I am responsible (Mortley, 1991). The highest dignity of uniqueness is the responsibility of one who cannot be moved and replaced by others, one can be substituted except for his own permission (Levinas, El, 1985). A person who cannot be substituted means someone as a substitute for another person is the subject of Levinas’s ethical teaching of responsibility. The substitution for others is to be the hostage of others. A person has no choice to be another person’s hostage. A person cannot flee from another person, and a person cannot avoid his or her responsibilities. Responsibility as a substitution despite being responsible for the crimes of others. Levinas states that a person, in reality, is responsible for others even when he commits a crime. (Levinas, IB, 2001). When meeting other people, all the attention of someone is hacked by others. Before someone takes a stance or action, someone is already hostage. Without doing anything, a person has been accused or persecuted by others because responsibility for him is total. Therefore one takes his place or someone is substituted (Magnis-Suseno, 2006). This is an ethical moment that appears to precede every rule
and statute. A hostage is a person who is found responsible for what he does not do. The person was responsible for the sins of others. The fate of a hostage is to be responsible for others, even if it is responsible for all of the others’ responsibilities. (Levinas, IB, 2001). The concept of Levinas on the responsibility of the substitution was inspired by the Talmud. "I" is the Messiah, says Levinas (Bertens, 1985). I am looking for the biblical inspiration of the Messiah who suffered for others (Isa. 53) while giving the philosophical foundation. Someone who is responsible for the mistakes of others is someone who appears to be the Redeemer. Responsibility becomes the act of redemption, because it bears the faults of others like his own mistakes, and even seeks to correct mistakes. That is, one tries to lift others out of his mistake. (Sobon, 2018).

2.4 Characteristic of Levinas’ Responsibility

The characteristics of the responsibilities of Levinas are uniquely impressed when compared to the concept of responsibility owned by other philosophers, such as Martin Buber. The unique characteristic of responsibility is the tone of criticism from Levinas can be explained as follows:

First, responsibility is concrete. Responsibility must be manifested concretely as a person’s responsibility to God must be manifested in concrete form to others. So, my who is a concrete must have a responsibility towards others which is concrete as well. I have to support and complement the lives of others who have revealed themselves as the destitute, poor, naked and hungry, or in other words the entire existence of others being my responsibility wholly (Levinas, TIH, 1979). In this context, when someone begs for my help, I am not impossible to ignore it or approach it with bare hands, otherwise, I have to approach and fulfill his needs according to the problem that is he faced.

Secondly, responsibility is asymmetric. I pay attention to others not for the sake and for myself, but the primary is for the sake and for others through the presence of his face (Levinas, EI, 1985). Based on this understanding, then when I pay attention to others it is not in order to wait, demand or expect a reply from that person. My relationship with others is not in a reciprocal relationship frame because I am directly the subject of another person (Levinas, EI, 1985). As such, interpersonal relationships are interpreted as asymmetrical, rather than reciprocal because the reciprocal affair is not my business, but it is the business of others. My business is to pay attention and help others selflessly and unconditionally, and not to think of the advantages behind it. In this context, the core difference with Buber is seen, where Buber's interpersonal relationship is symmetrical because of the being-with pattern, while Levinas is asymmetrical in the being-for pattern. That is, I am for others, but others are not for me. (Adiprasetya, 2000). With regard to Buber, one side of Levinas agrees with Buber, that oneself is not a substance but a relationship. The relationship "I-thee" is the first relationship; A priori relationship. On the other hand, Levinas criticizes the concept of Buber about intersubjectivity in relation to reciprocity or mutuality. For Buber, the relationship of "I-thee" resulted from a reciprocal dialogue (Hand, 1989). In this context, Levinas tried hard to get out of the trap of egoism that seemed to be the core of the issue of Western philosophy. Levinas wanted the philosophy to start from the ethical relationship between myself and the other. This ethical relationship moves from me to others without demanding a reply to me, and this movement is done only for others without reciprocal relations. Ethical responsibilities precede ontology, epistemology, and beyond self-interest.

3. Results and Discussions

In this section, the concept of Levinas’ responsibilities is discussed in the context of guidance and counseling, in particular, the encounter or ethical relationship between school counselor and student (counselee). The discussion is divided into three parts, namely to interpret the "helping profession" in responsibility, intentionality in multicultural counseling, and the responsibilities of the substitution and empathy.

3.1 To Interpret the "Helping Profession" in the Responsibility

Interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships between counselor and student (counselee) become one of the central themes within the public space of guidance and counseling. This relationship appears clearly and
firmly in the general and specific objectives that are to be achieved in the guidance and counseling service, which is that the counselor helps learners to achieve maturity and independence in life they and to exercise their development tasks optimally and intact which cover personal, social, learning, and career aspects. The special purpose of the guidance and counseling services is to help the counselee to be able to: (1) understand and accept yourself and the environment in which you live; (2) planning activities for completion of study, career development and future life; (3) to develop potential as optimally as possible; (4) adapt yourself to the environment; (5) overcoming the obstacles or difficulties faced in life and (6) actualize yourself responsibly (Permendikbud No. 111 year 2014).

Based on general and special purposes of guidance and counseling in Permendikbud No. 111, the year 2014, we acquire a conceptual representation that the counselor and counselee relationship is seen in the perspective of counselor help counselee, or in other words, the role and function of counselor are based on the concept of counseling as a helping profession (Wibowo, 2017). The competency of the counselor is used to help the counselee so that the counselee can develop its potential, talents, and interests optimally to achieve a happy life (Wibowo, 2017). The counselor helps the counselee should be understood in the framework of thinking responsibility. The counselor who is responsible for the counselee should be willing to help the counselee. The responsibilities of the counselor have preceded or underlie the attitude of helping the counselee. Responsibilities are inherent to the counselor before the counselor takes the initiative. That is, what is the point of starting each act and attitude of counselor to the counselee is responsibility because responsibility is the first data and the most fundamental data for the attitudes and actions taken by a counselor. (Levinas, OTB, 1978). A responsibility called primordial has become our burden every time we meet with "others" (‘autrui/l’autre, ‘the other’). When the man looked at me, I liked or did not like to have been responsible for him (Frans Magnis-Suseno, 2006). This is what is called an ethical encounter between a school counselor and a student (counselee). The presence of counselee (autrui/l'autre, ‘the other’) requires the responsibility of the counselor, responsibilities that cannot be transferred, can not be represented, cannot be denied, responsibilities that are preceded and beyond the knowledge and freedom of counselor.

The counselor who is aware of the benefits of this ethical encounter are also able to help the counselee to be able to realize themselves responsibly (page 3), actualize themselves responsibly (page 5), identifying themselves responsibly (page 8), to realize his decision responsibly (page 13), cooperate with others responsibly (page 14), and full responsibility in his life (page 19) (Permendikbud No. 111 year 2014), unburdened by other motivations that affects counselor, such as safeguarding ethical responsibilities as will be assessed (ACA Code of Ethics, 2014), and utilizing counselee in order to satisfy the needs and interests of counselor (Mappiare, 2011). In principle, counselor does not objectify counselee, or use the presence of counselee only to fulfill the needs and needs of counselor, because meeting with counselee, without the bargaining counselor should feel there is a bond of responsibility to practice goodness and fairness so there is no reason to dodge, "Do I guard my counselee?" The presence of a counselor is not as a keeper or security guard for counselee, but when the counselor gives something to the counselee is a manifestation of his responsibilities, the counselor has performed himself "as a human spirit", and the counselor succeeded to find the power that makes him excited. Thus, the responsibility of the counselor on the counselee is a caring attitude. Such relationships are only possible in serving counselee (the other). This orientation, referring that the presence of the counselee destroys the selfishness of the counselor, means that the counselor approaches the counselee is not departing from "Me", because the faces of others (counselee) have made the counselor a servant, and have lowered counselor from the throne and encourage counselor to come in charge of counselee, or in other words the ethical encounter counselor-counselee will be firmly realized if there is concrete action and not demand a reply from the counselor (asymmetrical). Concretely, counselors as the subject are responsible for an action. Here the counselor is not enough to only theorize but to act concretely to the counselee. Concrete has a meaning, the counselor should give something according to the needs of the counselee and should not approach the counselee with bare hands. Concrete can also be seen in the vertical and horizontal relationship as for Levinas a concrete responsibility to man is a tangible manifestation of responsibility to God. Here Levinas complements the most fundamental things of the counselor's role and function. Counselor is not only responsible for the counselee, parents, schools, public (Permendikbud No. 111 year 2014) ACA Code of Ethics, (2014), and yourself (American School Counselor Association (ASCA) Ethical Standards for School Counselors, 2016), but what is primarily responsible for God (Levinas, TI, 1979). This thought is in line with the religious notion that serving others (counselee) means serving God and instead

ignoring others (counselee) means ignoring God who is present in others (counselee) (Doren, 2018). Whereas the responsibility is asymmetric, it means that I am responsible for the counselee without expecting or waiting for a reply from counselee, there is a reply or no reply from the counselee is not the primary purpose (the reciprocation of being a right of counselee). The principle patterned being-for-so I (counselor)-For-You (counselee) should not be reversed into being-with patterned so You (counselee)-For-Me (counselor). From this point of view, the encounter or ethical relationship to the counselee (the other) is rooted in the love of the counselee without little interest (ethics of disinterestedness). Love for counselee never sleeps or insomnia. Based on this concept, the responsibility for Levinas is Love without Eros, without a little desire to be loved, or in the expression Pascal "Love without lust bondage" (Levinas, IB, 2001). This fact shows that love has become a leading indicator in displaying a caring attitude toward counselee. The caring attitude to the counselee involves experiencing unity with the counselee, solidarity with the counselee and redeem counselee (Ariyanto et al., 2016). So, the caring attitude of counselor to counselee is not to be interpreted as a mere moral message, but more than that it has been a way of life in the ethical encounter of the counselor.

### 3.2 Intentionality in Multicultural Counseling

The Association for Multicultural Counseling and Development (AMCD) lists three key competencies achieved by the counselor in multicultural counseling, and two of them emphasize "awareness", including 1). The awareness of a counselor on bias and the cultural values he held. In this context, the counselor must know their own culture or pre-conception that will have an impact on practice; 2). The awareness of the counselor to the worldview of counselee (client), where the counselor must recognize the viewpoint of counselee from a different world of a counselor (Talib, 2018). The counselor must realize that he/she is a cultural creature who has the competence of conducting multicultural counseling. A culturally skilled counselor should be aware of cultural assumptions, biases, stereotypes, and limitations. These statements affirm that in order to serve clients effectively, counselors should consider their own cultural background and the client’s cultural background. The counselor must exceed self-reference criteria and consider problems in counseling from the client’s cultural perspective (Wibowo, 2018). The principle of consciousness emphasized in multicultural counseling should refer to the concept of intentionality discussed by Levinas. For Levinas, the responsibility of the counselor concerned with the welfare of the counselee (ACA Code of Ethics, 2014), is not a necessity, because Levinas speaks in a phenomenological responsibility by pointing to a reality in our consciousness (intentionality). Phenomenologically, when the counselor meets the counselee, the counselor should have a self-awareness that this is a call for the counselor to be directly responsible for the safety of the counselee (Magnis-Suseno, 2005). Self-awareness makes the counselor understand that he/she is an integral part of the counselee because the counselor is already tied with the counselee, so that the attitude, thought, and feelings of counselor to the counselee are founded on these responsibilities (Magnis-Suseno, 2000). In this section, Levinas contributes significantly to the counselor, so that the counselor should not only be immersed in his or her own activities that are temporary, without regard to what this principle is, but the self-awareness of responsibility is the basic motivation of all attention and respect for the counselee (Magnis-Suseno, 2006). In this context, intentionality becomes an inseparable part of multicultural counseling.

### 3.3 Responsibility for the Substitution and Empathy

The results of the research of Gumilang related to the basic attitude of the counselor through the text Semar, are found four basic attitudes that counselors must have, namely friendly, thoughtful, honest, and empathy (Gumilang, 2016). In relation to the helping profession and interpersonal relationships, the basic attitude of empathy is regarded as the main component (Myers, 1999). Empathy is the ability and sensitivity of the counselor to understand and feel what is being experienced by counselee from a counselee standpoint (Rogers, 1961; Capuzzi & Gross, 2007; Komalasari, 2011). Empathy can also be understood not only through the expression of the words, but more than that it is an experiential expression of counselee (Brodley, 1996). In this context, empathy does not play a role as a substitution, but a responsibility that is acting as a substitution. Empathy must be paired with substitution so that empathy is stronger. The responsibility of the substitution is not just as a representative object, and it is not also a psychological event of a feeling of pity, but the counselor puts themselves in a place of counselee (the other), which differs from the counselor.
counselor is not just entering the personal world of a counselor without being transformed into a counselee (Triyono, 2008), but replacing the place of the counselee, became a "hostage" for the counselee or all the attention of the counselor "plowed" by the counselee. The action of the counselor in the substitution does not begin and terminate in the counselor but departs from the counselor to the counselee without demanding a reply to the counselor. The substitution of the counselee means that the counselor leaves themselves for the sake of counselee. More than that, the counselor is responsible for what the counselor does not do, on the contrary to what is done by the counselee to the counselor. A counselor is responsible for errors and omissions of the counselee. A counselor is responsible for the accidents or injuries of the counselee. Responsible for the counselee is responsible for the wounds and affliction of the counselee. This is a total manifestation of responsibility, meaning that the burden and struggle of the counselee become the burden and struggle of the counselor as well, and the responsibility of being the act of redemption because the counselor endures the faults, burdens, and struggles of counselee as the faults, burdens, and struggles of the counselor, and even attempt to correct such mistakes or conflicts. That is, the counselor tries to help counselee out of his problem, burden, and struggle.

The responsibility of the substitution states that the counselee (the other) as others and the counselee are unique. The uniqueness referred to by Levinas is not just counselor and counselee have a background, interest, talent, potency, unique knowledge, as defined by the ASCA that the school counselor has unique skills and qualifications and counselee (learner) also has a uniqueness (ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselor, 2016), but more than that Levinas wants to declare that unique means not only in the relationship between counselee and counselors, but counselee becomes the only which means at that time, and simultaneously counselor to find his identity. The uniqueness of counselee cannot be reduced to the same type. This is the unique ethical relationship of counselor to the uniqueness of counselee. Uniqueness can also be interpreted as diversity or distinction, and this diversity and distinction should be the place to complement and help each other, not to judge, or to demand a counselee to make decisions or behave with way that is consistent with the values of counselor rather than counselee, and or counselor make value judgments about counselee and see counselee as true or false, moral or immoral, rather than distinct or varied. The counselor can complement and help the counselee if there is an ethical encounter with the counselee. In the context of ethical encounters, diversity or distinction must first be appreciated with all its uniqueness. How counselors can meet others (counselee) while personally unable to accept a difference. That means the counselor should be able to see the counselee as others with all its uniqueness. The counselor who fails to see uniqueness or differences will lose respect from counselee, consequently, arise a tendency to unhealthy relationships. Conversely, counselors who are able to see counselee as unique and distinct individuals are counselors who are able to see the counselee as good, true and beautiful in his eyes, because for him the counselee is a neighbor. This principle is in line with the statement (Hintzze, 2015), that I am encouraged to take the attitude to bind brotherhood with others because of his presence.

3.4 Reconciliation as the Goal of Responsibility

The main purpose of responsibility is reconciliation. By the time Jonah carried out his responsibilities to the people of Nineveh, the people of Nineveh had a reconciliation. This indicates that where responsibility is performed there is reconciliation. The concept of redemption used by Levinas also illustrates the realization of reconciliation between God and his people. Reconciliation can be understood as exchanging places with 'the other', meaning that when someone reconciled someone exchanged a place with 'the other' and is in solidarity rather than against 'the other' (Dami, 2019). Reconciliation is a process of overcoming struggle/alienation through the introduction of solidarity, creating peace, restoration of relationships, positive change, new frameworks, and the meaningful togetherness both spiritually or politically the midst of unharmonious existence, dehumanization, and polarization. Reconciliation is a spiritual discipline, which is the way one learns to surrender and obey God’s will. This understanding led a person to an understanding that he had to attach reconciliation in his life because reconciliation became his mindset and way of life (DeYoung, 2012). In line with it, Gopin explains that reconciliation has become the norm in one’s life, and his individual life has a great expectation of encouraging peace in society. The word reconciliation has a theological power that transforms the society and nation when used in the personal and social change process (Gopin, 2002).
4. Conclusion

Responsibility becomes the center of attention and the deep power of reflection of Levinas, which is expressed in an ethical encounter of the counselor. Responsibility is already inherent to a counselor before or precedes initiatives, knowledge and freedom counselor. That is, responsibility is not something that is imposed, because the responsibility has become an integral part of all the attitudes and actions of counselor to the counselee, the counselor exists for counselee, not vice versa. Based on this understanding, conclusion can be taken in relation to the ethical encounter of the counselor-counselee, as follows: 1) Helping profession must be interpreted in the framework of thinking responsibility. Here the encounter with the counselee destroys the ego of the counselor, meaning that the counselor approaches the counselee is not departing from "Me", because the counselee has made the counselor a servant, and has lowered the counselor from his throne and encouraged the counselor be a subject that must come responsible for the counselee, and the responsibilities of the counselor can be realized in concrete action and do not demand a response from the counselee (asymmetric); 2) Responsibility in the context of multicultural counseling requires counselor to face the counselee to be aware of themselves (intentionality) called to be responsible for the safety of counselor. Departing from this principle of intentionality, the counselor is aware of their cultural background and are aware of the worldview of the counselee; 3) Empathy as the main component of the basic attitude of the counselor in its existence requires the responsibility of the substitution. The responsibilities of substitution are not only as objects of representation and psychological events but one-in-the-place-of-another. The substitution responsibility is the total and unique responsibility of the counselor to the unique counselee. Based on these findings, the concept of Levinas’ responsibilities has contributed and established the concept of responsibility in the literature of guidance and counseling, as well as counselors can elaborate on the concept of Levinas’ responsibility in ethical relationships counselor-counselee so in the practice of counseling counselors do not trap themselves in conditioning; 4) The goal that will be accomplished in carrying out responsibilities is reconciliation. Reconciliation should be the main goal in the ethical encounter between counselor and counselee because through the reconciliation of ethical encounters between counselor and counselee become qualified.

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the editors of IJSSH for significant revisions, valuable time and support, and valuable advice so that this article can be solved and published.
References


---

Biography of Authors

Zummy Anselmus Dami, S.Th., M. Pd. was born in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara on January 8th, 1982. He is a Senior Lecturer in Universitas Persatuan Guru 1945 NTT, Department of Guidance and Counseling. He has finished his bachelor degree in the Faculty of Theology, Institut Injil Indonesia in 2007. He finished his master degree in the Postgraduate Program, Magister Program, Education Management, Satya Wacana Christian University in 2011.

Email: zummydami82@gmail.com
Sinti ID: 6157217/ Google Scholar ID: czQcSoQAAAJ

Imanuela Pandu was born in Surabaya on May 31st, 1982. He is a lecturer at the Politeknik Negeri Ambon, in the study program of the Business Administration. He teaches courses of Christian Religious Education and Citizenship Education. In addition, He also actively teaches at several high schools in Ambon such as Sekolah Tinggi Teologia Maluku (STTEMA), Akademi Maritim Maluku, Sekolah Tinggi Teologi Injili Jakarta (STTIJ) in Ambon.

Email: imanuelgtpandu@gmail.com

Elka Anakotta was born in Ambon on November 1st, 1976. She is a lecturer at The Christian State Institute of Ambon. She has completed her study in Bachelor of Theology, Christian University of Satya Wacana Salatiga in 1998; in 2001, she gained Master of Sociology from Christian University of Satya Wacana; and in 2008, she has finished her Doctor in Philosophy field, University of Indonesia. She has presented many papers at the University of Indonesia, The Protestant State of College, the University of Gadjah Mada Jogjakarta, the University of Islam Indonesia Jogjakarta, and the University of Education Indonesia Bandung.

Email: anakottaelka@gmail.com

Agusthinus Sahureka was born on April 29th, 1986 in Leksula. He is now a lecturer at STT Maluku. He is currently serves as a Youth Pastor at GSJA Ebenhaezer Suli. He graduated from Satya Bhakti STT, Malang in 2010 and in 2011 he has completed his Bachelor of Christian Education (S. Pd. K) in STIPAK Duta Harapan. Currently he is finishing his thesis (M.Th) at STT Satya Bhakti, Malang.

Email: nusken.sahureka@gmail.com